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Preface 
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1. Summary 
This work aims to assess the degree of competition in the Norwegian air transport market with the 
help of a comparative analysis that includes eight benchmark countries (Denmark, Finland, Sweden, 
Spain, Ireland, Italy, Portugal, UK).  
In order to proxy the degree of competition, this note evaluates market concentration levels. The 
analysis of the concentration levels uses the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). HHI expresses market 
concentration by the sum of the squared individual market shares. The fewer firms there are serving a 
market and the larger the variations in market shares, the higher is the resulting HHI score. The higher 
the score, the more concentrated a market; hence the lower the level of competition. HHI reaches its 
maximum of 10,000 for purely monopolistic markets. Normally, regulatory agencies consider markets 
with HHI scores of more than 2,500 points as highly concentrated and assume suppliers to have 
‘market power’. The transport market in general and perhaps the air transport market in particular is 
characterized by an ‘Increasing Returns to Scale/Density’ cost structure, meaning that larger units and 
denser networks reduce the unit costs of production on average. This is an underlying force tending to 
cause a higher concentration compared with more conventional competitive markets with constant 
returns to scale.   
Based on airline flight schedule data, sourced from the ‘SRS-Analyser’ database, we calculate the HHI 
index on the city-pair level, restricted to direct flights only. For Norway, a list showing individual HHI 
scores for all city-pairs operated in the year 2018 is provided in Attachment 3.  
We identify that roughly 75% of all 342 relevant city-pairs served in 2018 are pure monopoly markets. 
Only 13 city-pairs reach scores of 5,000 or below. In general, a score below 5000 requires at least three 
airlines to serve the city-pair in parallel. The majority of the routes with HHI scores of or below 5000 
points link Norway with European destinations, only three city-pairs are domestic (Bergen - Stavanger, 
Oslo - Stavanger, Oslo - Trondheim).  Figure S1 summarizes this national perspective by mapping the 
number of city-pairs that fall into a certain HHI interval. In this perspective, the aggregated Norwegian 
air transport market has to be characterised as highly concentrated. 
 
Figure S1: Number of city-pairs involving at least one Norwegian airport vs. HHI-scores 2018 
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Further, we weight the city-pair specific HHI scores for ‘assumed demand’. That is, we take into account 
how often traveller are affected by different competitive situations and adjust the respective HHI 
scores accordingly. In the absence of suitable demand statistics, we use the number of seats offered 
per city-pair to proxy the underlying demand. Figure S2 summarizes this national perspective by 
mapping the number of ‘available seats’ that fall into a certain HHI score interval. 
 
Figure S2: Available seats on city-pairs involving at least one Norwegian airport and HHI-scores 2018 
    
 
In the light of this perspective, we still find that the Norwegian air transport market has to be labelled 
as highly concentrated. We notice however, that high demand on a few relatively competitive routes 
changes the distribution pattern substantially compared to Figure S1. In this weighted perspective, 
75% of all domestic seats available are subject to some degree of competition (HHI scores: 4,750 - 
9,765). In fact, 71% of all available seats are offered on city-pairs with HHI scores below 6,000.  
If we in addition exclude all seats provided on PSO and PSO-related city-pairs from the analysis, we 
find that only 15% of all domestic seats are purely ‘monopoly seats’ and hence, 85% of the seat volume 
is offered on city-pairs that are subject to some degree of competition.   
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Next, we compare the distribution of weighted city-pair specific HHI scores for Norway with those for 
the markets of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom.  
Figure S3 visualizes the domestic comparison with the eight benchmark countries. We realize that the 
share of ‘domestic monopoly seats’ is in six out of eight benchmark countries higher than in Norway. 
Only the domestic markets of Spain and Portugal seem to have a ‘more favourable’ distribution than 
Norway.  
 
Figure S3: Distribution of ‘available seats’ in percent per HHI score intervals - domestic city-pairs 2018 - comparison 
 
 
We conclude that domestic air passenger transport markets are generally highly concentrated. This 
holds true for Norway as well. However, the concentration level for the Norwegian domestic market 
is rather low in direct comparison to the benchmark countries.  
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Figure S4 presents the results for the European city-pairs. For Norway, only 5 per cent of all seats are 
offered on routes with HHI scores below 4,000. Compared with the other countries, this is a relatively 
low value. On the other hand, Norway has a rather large share of seats that fall into a HHI score range 
between 4,000 - 6,000 points, indicating around two airlines/route on average. In total, the 
distributions shown in the figure suggest that Norway is most comparable to Sweden, Ireland, and the 
UK. Denmark and, most notably, Spain and Portugal seem to have lower levels of concentration on 
their European city-pair markets.  
 
Figure S4: Distribution of ‘available seats’ in percent per HHI score intervals - European city-pairs 2018 - comparison 
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Finally, Figure S5 compares the distribution in an intercontinental city-pair context. We see that 39 per 
cent of Norway’s intercontinental city-pair markets fall into the HHI score interval (6 000, 8 000]. 
However, only 13 such city-pair markets, linking a Norwegian airport with an intercontinental 
destination, existed in 2018. The share of 39 percent, therefore, relates to only two observations—the 
city-pair markets DXB-OSL and BKK-OSL. Consequently, the small intercontinental segment has to be 
characterized as highly concentrated. 
 
Figure S5: Distribution of ‘available seats’ in percent per HHI score intervals - Intercontinental city-pairs 2018 - comparison 
 
 
Overall, it appears that all Scandinavian countries as well as Portugal have rather concentrated 
intercontinental markets. Spain and particularly the UK on the other hand, reach HHI scores indicating 
lower levels of market concentration. 
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Next, we obtain aggregated HHI scores for the ‘average seat’ in each segment. That is, we first multiply 
the seats of a city-pair with the route’s individual HHI score. We then aggregate the values for all city-
pairs of a segment (domestic, European, intercontinental) and divide the sum by the total number of 
seats available in the segment. For Norway, this yields the ‘average seat HHI scores’ as shown in Table 
S1. 
 
Table S1: HHI-score for ‘average seat’ 2018 - Norwegian city-pairs 
 Segment/City-pairs 
 
 Domestic European Intercontinental 
    
HHI-score 6 377 6 962 9 171 
 
We find that the domestic city-pair market in Norway is on average less concentrated than the 
European and the intercontinental city-pair market. Note that a ‘typical’ domestic, high-demand city-
pair in Norway is served by SAS and Norwegian more or less in parallel, which drives HHI scores towards 
5,000 points. On the opposite end, multiple low-demand city-pairs are typically served by only one 
airline (e.g. Widerøe), which forces the ‘average seat’ HHI scores towards 10,000 points. The European 
and, most notably, the intercontinental city-pair segments score considerably higher, indicating the 
dominance of monopoly markets. 
Finally, we compare the segmented Norwegian ‘average seat’ concentration levels with those of the 
benchmark countries. We find that Norway has the second lowest domestic value among the 
benchmark countries. Only Spain seems to have a less concentrated domestic market. In comparison 
with the Scandinavian countries, Norway’s domestic HHI score is about 1,000 points lower. We further 
identify a reduction in domestic market concentration over the last decade.  
In terms of the ‘European segment’ as well as the ‘Intercontinental segment’, the Norwegian ‘average 
seat scores’ are in line with the values of the other Scandinavian countries. Particularly in an 
intercontinental perspective, the markets of Norway, Denmark, and Finland have to be described as 
highly concentrated. The same counts with reservation for Sweden. The remaining benchmark 
countries outside of Scandinavia score better.  
 
To conclude, we have compared the concentration levels for Norway with those of the respective 
markets of Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. We find 
that air passenger transport markets are generally highly concentrated. We further derive that the 
‘average’ concentration level in the Norwegian domestic market is rather low in direct comparison to 
the benchmark countries - but still high in absolute terms. Moreover, we conclude for Norway that 
concentration levels in the European and in the intercontinental market segments are comparable to 
those in other Scandinavia countries. 
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2. Introduction 
The liberalization of the air transport industry some 30 years ago has sparked off intensive research 
efforts. Several authors have studied resulting changes in air transport networks, such as the 
development of hub and spoke network structures (e.g. Dennis (1998), Burghouwt and Hakfoort 
(2001)). Others have focused on the effects of liberalization on air fares (e.g. Goolsbee and Syverson 
(2008), Brueckner, Lee, and Singer (2013)). A third group of publications deals with the spatial 
distribution of benefits from competition (e.g. Dobruszkes (2009), Lieshout et al. (2016)). Research 
addressing the competitive state of national air transport networks is scares, especially in the 
Scandinavian context. 
The main objective of this report is to gain additional insights into the competitive situation in the 
Norwegian air transport market. This note aims to assess the degree of competition by means of a 
comparative analysis with eight benchmark countries.  
The remainder of this note is organized as follows: First, the methodology is presented. This includes 
a brief discussion of the data and the limitations of the research approach selected . We further provide 
a short introduction of how the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index is calculated and how different index 
values can be interpreted. Chapter 3 starts with a presentation of the Norwegian Air Transport 
Network (as define in this note), before market concentration levels for Norway are derived and 
compared with those of the benchmark countries. The note ends with a discussion of the findings and 
concluding remarks in Chapter 5. 
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3. Methods  
3.1 Data, Research Focus, Limitations 
The analysis in this note is based on data sourced from the SRS-Analyser database (SRS). The software 
RStudio version 1.1.463 is used for statistically analysing the data. Based on airline flight schedules, 
SRS contains a wide set of air transport information, such as statistics on number of flights and seats 
provided by airlines within a specific time window for any two airports linked by the airlines. SRS uses 
‘IATA notations’ to identify airlines (‘two-letter code’) and airports (‘three-letter code’). We follow this 
approach in the main document and match the IATA codes with the respective full airline and airport 
names in Attachments 1 and 2 of this note.  
Statistics in SRS are strictly differentiated for different airline companies. A user can, for example, find 
separate information for flights operated by airline ‘DY’ (Norwegian Air Shuttle AS) and by airline ‘D8’ 
(Norwegian Air International Ltd.). In our analysis, however, treating the two airlines as independent 
might show competition where in reality none exists. In the initial data manipulation process for this 
project, we therefore integrate airlines with their subsidiaries into only one entity. This approach is 
applied to the subsidiaries of the Norwegian, Lufthansa, KLM, Alitalia, Iberia, and Wizzair airlines. 
Further, SRS reports data for direct flights between two airports (city-pair). But since passengers 
regularly travel between airports that are not connected by direct flights, they have to transfer at some 
third transfer airport. Due to the rather complex air transport network structure, travellers can often 
choose between multiple transfer airport alternatives. For example, a traveller planning to fly from 
Ålesund to New York might transfer at either OSL or AMS or some other transfer airport. The choice of 
the distinct transfer airport is dependent on a large set of attributes, such as temporal coordination in 
the network, the traveller’s personal preference of service attributes, etc. In order to comprehensively 
assess the competitive situation for travels between Ålesund and New York, all possible travel paths 
between the two cities have to be identified and compared. This requires a rather complex modelling 
exercise, which cannot be conducted within the limits of this project1. Therefore, the analysis of the 
competitive state presented in this note is restricted to direct, non-stop routings between two airports. 
This implies that the findings in this note might underestimate exiting levels of competition.  
Based on the results presented in this note, an interested reader might also be tempted to infer results 
for a one-stop travel path. Such an approach, however, can lead to incorrect conclusions and should 
be avoided. For example, even though both direct routes ‘KSU-OSL’ and ‘OSL-LGW’ are monopoly 
routes, an air journey between KSU and LGW will anyway be subject to at least some degree of 
competition. This is because multiple additional travel paths connecting KSU with LGW are available 
to the customer. Depending on personal preferences and temporal network coordination, an air 
traveller could very well also choose to fly KSU-TRD-LGW or KSU-BGO-LGW. These alternatives are 
operated by airlines other than the KSU-OSL route; hence, journeys between KSU and LGW can be 
considered to be subject to competition. Additionally, one might see the airports LHR, LTN, and STN as 
substitute for LGW, which ‘complicates’ the scenario even further. Similar cases can easily be 
constructed for domestic city-pairs. 
The reporting of non-stop flights in SRS comes with an additional challenge that the reader has to be 
aware of. So-called ‘milk-routes’ are split into independent sub-routes in this analysis. For example, in 
                                                          
1 For a detailed discussion of the underlying issue, the interested reader may consult Lijesen (2004). For a more 
recent analysis of the European market covering also indirect routings we refer to Lieshout et al. (2016). Finally, 
we point to an ongoing project at HiMolde that analyses the connectivity of Norwegian airports. Comparing 
indirect travel with direct travel paths is one key feature of the work. 
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this analysis, the Widerøe route ‘WF 974’ (route number), which connects the airports HFT, HVG, and 
MEH, is treated as the two independent routes HFT-HVG and HVG-MEH. This inflates the flight and 
seat statistics presented in later Chapters, compared to other openly accessible statistics that might 
report on ‘route number levels’. 
Further, SRS reports only supply-side data. Information on demand, e.g. in the form of passenger 
statistics, is not included and is difficult to obtain, especially for indirect travel paths. The route-specific 
seats statistics in Attachment 3 might, however, still allow the reader to gauge the size of demand that 
is affected by the different stages of competition. 
In the analysis, we focus on the competition in the passenger air transport market. Flight movements 
conducted by pure airfreight aircrafts are therefore disregarded. Further, we exclude from the analysis 
‘flights’ that were ‘registered’ by an official flight number, but were in fact performed by bus or train.  
SRS statistics are aggregated based on the observation of individual flights between airports. This 
means that the database contains, for example, statistics on direct flights between BGO and NRT. 
However, the database shows that this direct flight was served only four times in 2018. In order to limit 
the analysis to ‘relevant’ markets (city-pairs), we discard all direct flights between airports that were 
served less than 50 times per year by the same airline. We regard this constraint as rather soft, since 
it implies that we include all city-pairs that were offered on average once a week.  
We perform the analysis based on aggregated annual statistics. This includes some degree of 
uncertainty of which the reader should be aware. First, airlines typically do not set up their route 
schedules on an annual basis—they operate with separate flight schedules for each so-called IATA-
season (winter/summer). If airline ‘a’ and airline ’b’ operate the same route but in different seasons of 
the same calendar year, the annual aggregation approach applied in this note might indicate 
competition (within a year), where none existed in reality (within the season). We assess this issue as 
limited to a few individual cases. The aforementioned constraint of at least 50 flights per year per 
airline also dampens the issue. Second, if a route is identified as ‘competitive’ in this report, this 
statement should be treated with some caution. The interested reader might additionally consult the 
respective airline’s flight schedules. This might reveal that different airlines serve the same route, but 
on different days and/or different times of the day. In this case, some travellers might not see the 
different airlines as substitutes; hence, in such cases an assumed inverse relationship between market 
concentration identified in this note and actual airline ticket pricing does not hold.  
13 
 
3.2 The Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
The Herfindahl–Hirschman Index (HHI) is a popular measure to analyze the concentration of markets. 
Originally introduced by Albert Hirschman in 1945 and Orris Herfindahl in 19502, HHI today is a widely 
applied metric both in academic research and in public policy action, aiming at the regulation of 
markets.  
HHI expresses market concentration by the sum of the squared individual market shares. The fewer 
firms there are serving a market and the larger the variations in market shares are, the higher are the 
resulting HHI scores.3 HHI, applied to a market of passenger air transport between airport 𝑥1 and 
airport 𝑥2, can be expressed by the following equation: 
 
𝐻𝐻𝐼𝑥1𝑥2 ≡  ∑ 𝛼𝑖
2𝑛
𝑖=1       (1) 
 
where 𝛼𝑖 denotes airline 𝑖’s market share in the market between 𝑥1 and 𝑥2. Airline 𝑖 is one operator 
out of the set of airlines 𝐼. The set describes all airlines serving that market (𝑖 ∈ 𝐼). By design, HHI 
scores 𝛾 can take any value in the following interval: HHI = {0 < 𝛾 ≤ 10,000}. Values at the lower 
limit indicate so-called atomistic markets (perfect competition) while values at the upper limit 
represent pure monopoly markets.  
Figure 1(a) visualizes HHI scores for some exemplified market settings. On the x-axis, the number of 
airlines in the market is mapped and on the y-axis, HHI scores are traced. The diverse curves reflect 
different market structures in terms of market share distribution. The black curve, for example, shows 
HHI scores for markets where market shares are equally distributed among all existing operators. In a 
market with three airlines for instant, each airline would hold 33% of the market. Note that this ‘equal 
market share curve’ reflects a ‘minimum HHI frontier’ in regard to the number of airlines in the market 
- no matter the distribution of the market shares. In other words, no market with two airline can have 
a HHI score below 5000, no market with three airlines lower than 3333, etc. For air transport markets 
(route/city-pair level) it is therefore very unlikely to find HHI scores below 2000, since this requires at 
least 6 airlines to serve the same route.  
 
Figure 1: (a) HHI index – example scores; (b) HHI index - possible scores for two airline market 
 
                                                          
2 For an enlightening discussion of the HHI, its history and its challenges once applied to network industries, the 
reader might consult Roberts (2014). 
3 For further details, the interested reader might consult standard textbooks on ‘Industrial Organization’ such 
as Waldman and Jensen (2013) or Corchón, Marini, and Edward Elgar (2018). 
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On the contrary, in markets with unevenly distributed market share, the resulting HHI score will always 
be higher than indicated by the black curve. The grey curves show some such possible scenarios where 
either the market share of one dominating airline 𝑎1 or of two dominating airlines 𝑎1 and 𝑎2 are fixed. 
In both cases, the remaining market shares are again evenly distributed among all other participating 
airlines. Note the importance of the market share of the ‘largest’ airline for the overall HHI. Note 
further how relatively ‘unimportant’ the market share distribution among the remaining airlines is for 
the HHI scores giving the fact of one dominating airline. 
Finally, figure 1(b) shows possible HHI scores for a duopolistic market in regard to the market share 
distribution among the two airlines. Note that no matter this distribution, HHI scores for a duopoly will 
never lie below 5,000, hence markets with HHI scores below that threshold require at least one more 
operator. The reader has to be aware however, that HHI scores above 5,000 do not comparatively 
describe markets with only one or two airline participating. Depending on specific uneven market 
share distributions, also markets with many more than two airlines can reach scores above 5,000.  
No generally valid definition exists that relates the HHI score to the market power of firms and hence 
their ability to generate excessive rents. The regulatory framework for mergers and acquisitions in the 
US and Europe might indirectly be used to set some basic framework. The US Department of Justice 
(USDOJ), for example, considers markets with HHI scores between 1,500 and 2,500 as moderately and 
markets with HHI scores of more than 2,500 points as highly concentrated. In the latter case, USDOJ 
considers transactions (e.g. mergers) that increase HHI by more than 200 points, as market power 
enhancing (USDOJ 2018). Similarly, the European Commission (EC) assesses transactions once a market 
has a HHI above 2,000 and changes resulting from mergers would exceed 150 points (European 
Commission 2004). Following this framework, the majority of all air transport markets (route level) 
have to be characterized as highly concentrated, from reasons briefly described above. Mergers 
affecting those markets would most likely always be subject to review by some regulatory agency. 
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4. Analysis 
This chapter starts with a brief introduction to the Norwegian Air Transport System (NATS)4, based on 
the most recent annual statistics (2018). In addition, the development of some key numbers over the 
last decade is presented. Then, a section deals with the market concentration levels in the NATS. Next, 
the air transport systems of eight benchmark countries are introduced and compared to the NATS. The 
final part of the chapter compares market concentration levels in Norway with those in the benchmark 
countries. 
4.1 The Norwegian Air Transport System  
4.1.1 Snapshot 2018 
Figure 2 provides an overview of the Norwegian Air Transport System in terms of network size (number 
of airports) and airlines serving that network.  
The left side of the figure shows the number of airports that can be reached by any direct flight 
originating from an airport within Norway. For 2018, the dataset indicates that the Norwegian 
domestic network consists of 47 different airports. In addition, 95 different European airports can be 
reached with a direct flight from Norway (corrected for double-counting). Furthermore, 13 destination 
airports outside of Europe can be reached without an intermediate stop. In total, the network 
considered here (as defined by the non-stop constraint) had 155 airports in 2018. The number of city-
pair relations (two airports that are connected by a direct flight) is a multiple of this value. In fact, we 
find that for 2018, 126 different domestic, 203 European, and 13 intercontinental individual city-pairs 
were served.  
 
Figure 2: Snapshot Norwegian Air Transport System 2018;  
(a) Airports connected by direct flight per route type     (b) Airlines by route type 
 
Note: in (b) in total, 38 Airlines aggregated across all route types; including the helicopter operator ‘LTR’ (Lufttransport AS)    
Table 1 provides some additional insights concerning the distribution of links to airports outside of 
Norway. We find that 11 Norwegian airports offer at least one direct route to a European destination. 
For intercontinental destinations, only OSL and BGO provide such services. However, nine domestic 
airports have direct links to European hub airports other than OSL, which could be used as a transfer 
point to both European and intercontinental destinations.  
 
                                                          
4 Even though this term typically embraces more components than airports and airlines alone, we use this term 
in this note to address different countries’ air transport networks. 
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Table 1: Snapshot 2018 – Norwegian Airports with non-stop flights to non-Norwegian airports 
Routes to Airports (IATA Codes) 
 
European Airports    "AES" "BGO" "BOO" "EVE" "HAU"  "KRS" "OSL" "SVG" "TOS" "TRD" "TRF"  
  
Intercontinental Airports "BGO" "OSL" 
  
‘Hub’-Airports ≠ OSL "AES" "BGO" "BOO" "HAU" "KRS" "SVG" "TOS"  "TRD" "TRF" 
Note: European ‘Hub-Airports’ = {𝐴𝑀𝑆, 𝐴𝑅𝑁, 𝐶𝐷𝐺, 𝐶𝑃𝐻, 𝐹𝑅𝐴, 𝐻𝐸𝐿, 𝐿𝐺𝑊, 𝐿𝐻𝑅, 𝑀𝐴𝐷, 𝑀𝑈𝐶}; for airport names, see 
attachment 2 
The right-hand side of Figure 1 states the statistics for the ‘airside’ of the market (bound to the network 
defined above). In 2018, five airlines were offering domestic passenger air transport services.5 As Table 
2 indicates, this count includes the helicopter operator ‘Lufttransport AS’ (LTR), which operates 
exclusively on the route ‘BOO-VRY’, and the airline ‘Danish Air Transport AS’ (DX), which serves the 
domestic routes ‘OLA-OSL’ and ‘OSL-SRP’. The remainder of all domestic routes in Norway are 
operated by only three airlines. On the other hand, 33 airlines serve European destinations (including 
four domestically operating airlines), while only six airlines offer intercontinental services. Aggregated 
across all route types and corrected for double-counting, 38 different airlines are operating from/to at 
least one Norwegian airport. 
 
Table 2: Snapshot 2018 – Airlines serving the Norwegian Air Transport System per Route Type 
Route type Airline (IATA Codes) 
 
Domestic  "DX"  "DY"  "LTR" "SK"  "WF"  
 
European "0B" "2N" "7R" "AF" "AY" "BA" "BM" "BT" "DX" "DY" "ET" "EW" "FI" "FR" "IB" "KL" "LH" "LM" 
"LO" "OS" "OU" "PC" "PF" "RC" "SK" "SN" "SU" "TK" "TP" "U2" "VY" "W9" "WF"” 
 
Intercontinental "DY" "EK" "PK" "QR" "SK" "TG"   
Note: for Airline names, see attachment 3  
Figure 3 shows the number of flights in the network for 2018 (aggregated to/from), differentiated for 
route type on the left-hand side and the distribution of flights from/to OSL vs. all remaining airports in 
Norway on the right.  
We find that the domestic segment accounts for more flights6 than the European segment and that 
the intercontinental segment is of a marginal size. Converted to daily averages, there are 
approximately 640 flights between domestic city-pairs, 490 between European, and 14 between 
intercontinental city-pairs. We further realize that approximately 56% of all flights performed in the 
network relevant to this analysis either depart or arrive at OSL. The remaining 44% of all flights connect 
city-pairs that do not include OSL. We assess this distribution as a consequence of the pronounced 
hub-and-spoke network structure of the NATS. 
                                                          
5 Services of the airline ‘FlyViking AS’ are not included since no route was served at least 50 times in 2018. 
6 Note that the ‘milk-route issue’ introduced in Section 3.1 inflates the domestic flights statistics.  
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Figure 3: Snapshot Norwegian Air Transport System 2018; 
(a) – Number of flights to/from Norway per route type      (b) ‘OSL-’ vs. ‘none-OSL’-routes of total flights per route type 
 
Note: ‘City-pair perspective’ – inbound and outbound statistics are aggregated; ’OSL-route’= route with ‘OSL’ as either 
departure or destination airport 
If one focuses on the routes to European destination, the share of OSL routes increases to 
approximately 65%. For intercontinental routes, the share of OSL routes reaches 96%. In fact, only one 
intercontinental route not connecting OSL was served in 2018. The database shows 171 flights 
between the airport of Bergen (BGO) and Steward International Airport (SWF; New York/Newburgh 
/US) operated by DY.  
Figure 4 mirrors the above statistics in the perspective of ‘available seats’ rather than ‘available flights’. 
We find that, expressed in available seats, the European segment is now larger than the domestic 
segment. Here, the diverse structure of the aircraft fleet used in the segments takes effect. Where the 
domestic segment is served by a mixture of small- and medium-sized aircrafts, flights to European 
destinations are typically served by medium-sized aircrafts. Calculating the seat capacity of ‘the 
average aircraft’ using the numbers in Figures 3 and 4, we find capacities of 106/155/298 seats 
respectively. Additionally, we notice that the share of ‘OSL routes’ increases across all route types, 
when expressed in ‘available seats’. This effect is most notable in the domestic segment, where the 
operation of ‘low-capacity airplanes’ (e.g. Dash-8 series), mainly in remote areas, increases the 
statistics in favour of the OSL routes.    
 
Figure 4: Snapshot Norwegian Air Transport System 2018; 
(a) – Number of  seats to/from Norway per route type      (b) ‘OSL-’ vs. ‘none-OSL’-routes of total seats per route type 
 
Note: ‘City-pair perspective’ – inbound and outbound statistics are aggregated; ’OSL-route’= route with ‘OSL’ as either 
departure or destination airport  
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In Table 1, we already specified which Norwegian airports have links to ‘hub-airports’ other than OSL. 
Referring to the initial discussion of indirect travel paths and their exclusion from this analysis (Section 
3.1), we anyhow consider those links as important determinants of market concentration. ‘Hub-
airports’ are not only destinations in their own right, but are used as transfer points to some other 
destination airport. In this role, links to ‘hub-airports’ outside Norway enable travellers to bypass OSL 
and hence competition is created even though the travel path via OSL might superficially appear to 
have low levels of competition. Therefore, Table 3 outlines additional statistics on the number of flights 
and ‘available seats’ for links that connect European ‘hub-airports’ with Norwegian airports other than 
OSL. We compare the statistics with the respective numbers for OSL and find that in 2018, 
approximately 33,000 flights were conducted between European ‘hub-airports’ and Norwegian 
airports other than OSL. This accounted for about 4 million seats. At the same time, about 57,000 
flights with 9.6 million seats were conducted between OSL and the same set of European ‘hub-
airports’. Assuming that supply statistics are correlated with underlying demand, we conclude that a 
noticeable share of travellers ‘bypass’ the national ‘hub-airport’ OSL. We further find that smaller 
aircraft are typically employed on ‘non-OSL-hub routes’. Here, the utilization of aircraft models like 
Embraer 175 on ‘hub-feeder routes’ (e.g. AMS-AES) drives down the average.  
 
Table 3: Snapshot 2018 – Links to European ‘Hub-Airports’ – ‘OSL-routes’ vs. ‘Non-OSL-routes’ 
 Routes linking to European ‘Hub’-Airport 
 
 ‘OSL-routes’ ‘Non-OSL-routes’ 
Flights 57 100 33 200 
Seats 9 664 600 4 074 600 
Seats/Flights 169 123 
Note: European ‘Hub-Airports’ defined as {𝐴𝑀𝑆, 𝐴𝑅𝑁, 𝐶𝐷𝐺, 𝐶𝑃𝐻, 𝐹𝑅𝐴, 𝐻𝐸𝐿, 𝐿𝐺𝑊, 𝐿𝐻𝑅, 𝑀𝐴𝐷, 𝑀𝑈𝐶} 
 
To complete the introduction of the Norwegian Air Transport System, we present some disaggregated 
route-specific statistics. First, Table 4 presents the ‘top five’ routes (precisely: bi-directional per city-
pair) in terms of number of flights conducted and ‘available seats’ for each route type. In addition, the 
statistics for the ‘median city-pair’ per route type are presented to allow for better assessment. These 
route statistics are aggregated across all airlines that served the city-pair in 2018. 
For the domestic segment, we first see that the OSL routes connecting to TRD, BGO, and SVG are the 
largest links, with good margin. In fact, more than 20 daily frequencies (one-way) are offered between 
the cities. Further, we realize that ‘BGO-SVG’ is the only ‘top-five’ route that does not link OSL, again 
highlighting the hub-and-spoke structure of the network. Next, we see that an ordinary domestic route 
(‘median city-pair’) is substantially smaller, with approximately 1.5 daily flights (one-way) and 130 daily 
seats. 
The top five European routes connect OSL with some other European ‘hub-airport’. It can be assumed 
that a causality exists between the prominence of hub-airports in the list and the rather low direct 
intercontinental connectivity of OSL. An assumedly substantial share of demand originating in Norway 
might serve as ‘feed’ for the networks of Air France/KLM, Finnair and SAS via CPH and ARN. Although 
labelled ‘European routes’ here, one can see these hub-links as part of an overall longer 
intercontinental travel path. The links to ARN and CPH have more than double the volume than the 
third-largest link to Amsterdam. The ‘median European route’, here represented by Oslo-Palanga, is 
about 2.5% of the volume of the largest European routes. 
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Table 4: Snapshot 2018 - Top-5/Median city-pairs per route type; available flights/seats 
 City - pair  City - pair  
  Flights  Seats       
Domestic OSL - TRD 17 149 OSL - TRD 2 918 363 
 BGO - OSL 16 629 BGO - OSL 2 862 363 
 OSL - SVG 14 642 OSL - SVG 2 474 585 
 OSL - TOS 9 770 OSL - TOS 1 694 165 
 BGO - SVG 7 748 BOO - OSL 1 180 779 
 :  :  
(median) BGO - SOG  1 177  OSL - RRS 48 269 
 
European ARN - OSL 12 841 ARN - OSL 2 261 693 
 CPH - OSL 12 456 CPH - OSL 2 248 827 
 AMS - OSL 6 060 LHR - OSL 940 660 
 LHR - OSL 5 787 AMS - OSL 875 849 
 HEL - OSL 4 928 FRA - OSL 736 372 
 :   : 
(median) OSL - PLQ 306 OSL - PSA 52 720 
 
Intercontinental DOH - OSL 918 DXB - OSL 301 822 
 BKK - OSL 830 BKK - OSL 280 138 
 DXB - OSL 813 DOH - OSL 238 462 
 EWR - OSL 724 EWR - OSL 192 496 
 JFK - OSL 477 JFK - OSL 145 640 
 :  :  
(median) FLL - OSL 288 FLL - OSL 69 948 
 
In terms of intercontinental links, the values of frequencies and ‘available seats’ are substantially 
lower. Aggregated to a metropolitan area level, the link between New York (EWR+JFK) and OSL is the 
largest one. Individually however, the routes linking OSL to Bangkok (BKK), Doha (DOH), and Dubai 
(DXB) are superior in terms of volume. The latter two routes might again be considered as transfer 
points to some other destination airport. 
 
Table 5: Snapshot 2018 - Top-5 city-pairs per route type – ‘non-OSL’; available flights/seats 
 City - pair  City - pair  
  Flights  Seats       
Domestic BGO - SVG 7 748 BGO - SVG 1 052 074 
 HFT - TOS 4 620 BGO - TRD 628 256 
 BGO - TRD 4 507 BOO - TRD 378 638 
 BOO - LKN 4 081 BOO - TOS 368 272 
 
 
(median) 
 
BGO - TRF 
: 
BGO - FDE 
3 485 
 
870  
 
BGO - TRF 
 
ANX - BOO 
281 254 
 
35 052 
European BGO - CPH 4 078 BGO - CPH 602 032 
 CPH - SVG 3 328 AMS - BGO 430 338 
 AMS - SVG 3 229 CPH - SVG 416 442 
 AMS - BGO 2 928 AMS - SVG 349 226 
 
 
(median) 
ABZ - SVG 
: 
SSZ - TRF 
2190 
 
238 
GDN - TRF 
: 
AGP - SVG 
314 688 
 
38 316  
     
Intercontinental BGO - SWF 171 BGO - SWF 32 319 
 
Mainly for reasons of comparison, Table 5 visualizes the corresponding ‘top-five routes’ that do not 
involve OSL. Apart from ‘BGO-SVG’, none of the domestic routes are close in size to their counterparts, 
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as shown in Table 4. Further, the four largest European routes connect to the two ‘hub-airports’ AMS 
and CPH. Finally, only one intercontinental direct route existed in 2018 that does not address OSL. In 
general, the largest ‘non-OSL links’ involve the airports BGO, BOO, SVG and TRD. 
 
4.1.2 Development in the years between 2008 and 2018 
This section provides a brief overview of how the Norwegian Air Transport System has evolved since 
20087. We focus on three metrics: number of airports in the network, airlines operating in the network, 
and available seats in the network.  
Figure 5: NATS - Evolvement 2008-2018 (per route type);  
(a) Airports connected by direct flight  
(b) Operating airlines  
(c) Available seats  
 
In terms of number of airports accessible by 
direct link originating in Norway (figure 5(a)), 
we see a rather stable pattern for the domestic 
part of the network. The number of European 
destinations accessible reached its maximum in 
2013 and has stabilized in the recent past to 
around 95 destination airports. The number of 
direct intercontinental destinations has, on a 
low level, continuously increased. Expressed in 
number of total city-pairs served, the network 
started in 2008 with 321, peaked in 2013 with 
410, and declined to 342 city-pairs in 2018. 
Concerning the number of airlines serving the 
segments (figure 5(b)), most notable is the 
decline in the domestic network, as indicated 
by the SRS database. The statistic peaked in 
2011 with 11 airlines and declined to five in 
2018. However, SRS has been somewhat 
inconsistent with airline names and airline 
codes over time. The past numbers, therefore, 
have to be considered somewhat uncertain. In 
addition, many airlines—such as ‘City Airlines’ 
(CF), alleged to have served ‘RYG-SVG’ in 
2011—might have done this with strong ties to 
one of the dominating airlines in the market, 
such as SK. The graph alone therefore does not 
support a general conclusion that market 
concentration of the domestic market has 
increased.  
Finally, part (c) of Figure 5 shows the substantial growth in supply since 2009 for all route types.  This 
growth, however, at least in part, relates to corrections following a massive decline in the financial 
crisis period. Furthermore, we observe the European segment overtaking the domestic one in 2013. 
 
                                                          
7 No data availability for years prior 2008. 
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4.2 Norway - Level of market concentration 
Applying formula (1) to all markets (city-pairs) involving at least one Norwegian airport, we derive HHI 
scores for each market. Attachment 3 provides a comprehensive overview of the market 
concentrations for all markets served in 2018 as well as their development in the most recent past. In 
addition, the tables show 2018 statistics on available seats and flights. 
We find that roughly 75% of all the 342 relevant city-pairs are pure monopoly markets. If we follow 
the systematization of USDOJ (2018) and European Commission (2004), literally all city-pair markets 
have to be termed as ‘highly concentrated’. Only 13 city-pairs reach scores of 5,000 or below (which 
in general requires at least three airlines). Out of those 13 city-pairs, only three are domestic (BGO-
SVG, OSL-SVG, OSL-TRD). The remaining ‘below-5,000’ city-pairs are all European markets. The least 
concentrated market is the European city-pair Paris Charles de Gaulle - Oslo (CDG-OSL) with an HHI 
score of 3,471. Figure 6 summarizes this national perspective by mapping the number of city-pairs that 
fall into a certain HHI interval. 
Figure 6: Number of city-pairs involving at least one Norwegian airport vs. HHI-scores 2018 
 
 
Figure 7 provides a more differentiated picture in terms of individual route types. The distributions for 
126 domestic, 203 European, and 13 intercontinental city-pairs (markets) are shown.  
For the domestic market (Figure 7(a)), we find that 83% of all city-pairs are purely monopoly city-pairs. 
That is to say, only 22 of the 126 domestic city-pairs achieve scores below 10,000 points. At first glance, 
this suggests a very low level of competition in the domestic network. Recall however, the definition 
of ‘city-pair’ applied in this note and the rather weak constraint of 50 flights per year to qualify as a 
city-pair for this analysis. Therefore, the 126 domestic city-pairs considered here might go beyond what 
a ‘common traveller’ would deem a valid set of city-pairs for her/his travel needs8 and hence the value 
of 83% monopoly city-pairs might sketch an overly negative picture. This will be further discussed on 
pages 22 and 23. 
The lowest domestic HHI scores are achieved for the city-pairs BGO-SVG (4,750) and OSL-TRD (4,975), 
where the three airlines DY, SK, and WF were present in 2018 (market shares: 27%/63%/10%; 
                                                          
8 For example, KSU-MOL and MJF-MQN are considered as valid city-pairs in this analysis. This ‘wide’ definition 
was necessary to ensure comparability with the domestic networks of the eight benchmark countries.  
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50%/49%/0.5%). The remaining city-pairs with scores below 10,000 points mostly link OSL with the 
regional airports or regional airports with each other. Both SK and DY typically serve those markets in 
parallel. A more even distribution of market shares between the two operators results in scores closer 
to 5,000, whereas uneven market share distribution gives scores closer to 10,000.  
Figure 7: Number of city-pairs involving at least one Norwegian airport and their HHI-scores in 2018 (per route type) 
(a) Domestic city-pairs  
(b) European city-pairs  
(c) Intercontinental city-pairs  
 
We note that HHI scores below 5,000 are 
generally rather scarce in the domestic market, 
even though three airlines exist in parallel. This 
contradiction is due to WF concentrating its 
operations on city-pairs between medium and 
smaller sized airports. Services between those 
airports often require aircrafts not operated by 
DY and SK. Therefore, WF’s operations only 
rarely compete with services of DY and SK.  
We recognize that 67 of the analysed 126 
domestic city-pairs are directly operated under 
Public Service Obligations (PSO) (e.g. OSY-TRD) 
or are indirectly related to such PSO-
operations, e.g. were PSO-airlines decided to 
operate a link which does not fall under the 
‘official’ PSO-regime (e.g. OSY-RVK). Such city-
pairs are by design purely monopoly city-pairs. 
If we exclude these city-pairs from the analysis 
and focus on city-pairs where demand is high 
enough to attract at least one commercially 
operating airline9, we identify ‘only’ ca. 60% of 
the city-pairs to be monopoly city-pairs. This 
value might still seem high, but recall the 
aforementioned notion on the definition of 
city-pairs in this document.  
For the European city-pairs, we identify 145 out of 203 markets as purely monopoly markets. The share 
of approximately 71% monopoly markets is therefore slightly lower than in the domestic case 
(including PSO routes), but higher if PSO routes are excluded. The European markets with the lowest 
market concentration are CDG-OSL (3,471), HAM-OSL (3,694) and ARN-BGO (3,706). If, however, we 
assume that the airports LHR, LGW, and STN serve the same metropolitan area, we can aggregate all 
services connecting OSL with one of the airports. In this case, the services of BA+SK (LHR), DY (LGW), 
and FR (STN) can be seen as substitutes and the resulting HHI score for the city-pair ‘Greater London 
Area - OSL’ is 2,691, making it the least concentrated market in the analysis. Considering TRF as 
substitute for OSL, in addition, the score declines even further to 2,537 (owing to the resulting more 
                                                          
9 Note that such city-pairs might still be dependent on the existence of ‘nearby’ PSO-routes to be commercially 
viable (e.g. SKN-TOS).   
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even distribution of market shares). A similar approach is possible for the metropolitan areas of Berlin 
and Paris (but with less dramatic impact on the HHI scores). 
For the intercontinental segment, we find that 11 out of 13 city-pairs are monopoly markets. Only BBK-
OSL (6,770) and DXB-OSL (8,903) are subject to some degree of competition. However, we note that 
EWR-OSL and JFL-OSL link Oslo to the same metropolitan area. If we aggregate all services (DY+SK) 
from Oslo to the ‘Greater New York Area’, the resulting HHI score for ‘New York-Oslo’ would be 5,100, 
indicating some degree of competition on the city-pair.
 
So far, the distribution of HHI scores was compared based on city-pair count. That implies that all city-
pairs were weighted equally. In reality, however, some routes might be more important to society than 
others; hence the distribution of HHI scores might change if corrected for ‘route-importance’. In the 
absence of a consistent demand dataset, we proxy ‘route importance’ by statistic on available seats in 
2018. Figure 8 presents the resulting distributions.
For the domestic network, we now find that 
25% of the ‘available seats’ are provided on 
purely monopoly city-pairs (including all PSO 
seats). That is, 75% of all domestic seats 
analysed here, are subject to some degree of 
competition (HHI scores: 4,750 - 9,765). In fact, 
71% of all ‘seats available’ are offered on city-
pairs with HHI scores below 6,000. The 
weightage for ‘route-importance’ yields 
thereby results different from the analysis 
based on city-pair count. Weighted for ‘seats 
available’, the domestic network appears to 
show substantially lower levels of 
concentration.  
If we now in addition exclude all seats provided 
on PSO and PSO-related city-pairs from the 
analysis, we find that only 15% of all domestic 
seats are purely ‘monopoly seats’ and hence, 
85% of the seat volume is offered on city-pairs 
that are subject to some degree of 
competition.   
We see a similar change—even though on a 
smaller scale—for the European city-pairs. 
Once corrected for volume, only 33% of the 
available seats stem from monopoly routes. 
However, HHI scores of around 5,000 still 
indicate a highly concentrated market. 
 
Figure 8: Available seats on city-pairs involving at least 
one Norwegian airport and their HHI-scores in 2018 (per 
route type) 
(a) Domestic city-pairs  
(b) European city-pairs  
(c) Intercontinental city-pairs  
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The differences between Figures 7 and 8 are partly related to the aspect that the ‘larger’ a route 
already is, the more attractive it is for additional airlines to join the market. Hence, larger routes will 
tend to have lower HHI scores (all else equal). Moreover, lower market concentration should lead to 
lower ticket prices, which again fosters demand growth on such routes.  
Figure 9 maps the ‘available seats’ statistic of all 342 city-pairs against their respective HHI scores. We 
see that city-pairs with slightly more than 500,000 seats per year (corresponds to approximately 3.5 
round-trips with Boeing 737–800 per day) are generally subject to some degree of competition. We 
identify LGW-OSL, OSL-SFX, AMS-BGO and CPH-SVG as the ‘largest’ monopoly city-pairs in the 
dataset10.  
On the other hand, supposedly ‘thin’ city-pairs can be operated by more than one airline at the same 
time. We find BGO-BLL (HHI 7,966, seats 14,100), BGO-HAM (HHI 5,440, seats 20,600) and FNC-OSL 
(HHI 5,645, seats 25,800) as the ‘thinnest’ non-monopoly city-pairs. Volumes on such city-pairs are 
rather low, resulting in on average less than one round-trip per day, even with small size aircraft. In 
this context, one can question whether travellers in fact see different airlines as substitutes and hence 
might benefit from the alleged degree of competition.  
Figure 9: Available seats on city-pairs involving at least one Norwegian airport vs. HHI-scores 2018 
 
 
In terms of consistency over time, we analyse the 342 city-pairs existing in 2018, concerning changes 
in their HHI scores in 2018 compared to those in 2010. No clear-cut tendency can be identified. We 
find that 38 city-pairs have become more concentrated with an increase of on average 1,800 points. 
At the same time, HHI scores of 50 other city-pairs declined by on average 2,300 points. No changes in 
scores occurred to 145 city-pairs, which were, and still are, monopoly markets. In addition, 109 city-
pairs were served in 2018 that had not been operated in 201011. The HHI scores of todays ‘top-10’ 
routes in terms of ‘available seats’ appear to be rather stable over time.  
  
                                                          
10 LGW-OSL and OSL-SFX can in a ‘metropolitan perspective’ be described as competitive city-pairs. 
11 We disregard city-pairs that had been operated in the past, but not in 2018. 
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4.3 Comparison with other countries 
This section sets out to compare the concentration levels in the Norwegian Air Transport System with 
the competitive situation in a sample of eight other countries. We have chosen Denmark, Sweden, and 
Finland to compare in the Nordic context. In addition, we look at Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, and the 
United Kingdom, which we believe have some common characteristics in terms of ‘peripheral’ location 
in Europe.  
The reader should anyway respect that individual features of a country/Air Transport Systems (e.g. 
locational aspects and overall population size) might significantly affect the results of the analysis. 
Ireland and the United Kingdom, for example, due to their favourable location, will likely attract strong 
demand for travel on the North-Atlantic routes; hence, it should have lower market concentration on 
those routes. The same counts for routes connecting the countries with the rest of Europe, since air 
travel on those routes faces lower competition by other modes of transportation. Spain and Italy, as 
popular holiday destinations on the other hand, will attract high volumes of travellers and hence 
airports of those countries should be attractive for airlines to connect to.  
Furthermore, the reader has to be aware of the interrelation between the location of a country and 
the route-type categorization used in this note. Due to their closeness to the African continent for 
example, Spain and Italy will naturally have a relatively ‘high’ number of intercontinental routes. 
Measured in flight distance, some of the links might be more comparable with Norwegian EU routes. 
Some of the Nordic countries might on the opposite have fewer intercontinental routes, due to their 
unfavourable ‘topological’ position for intercontinental flight in the network.  
4.3.1 Structure of the Air Transport Systems 
In order to facilitate the interpretation of the HHI scores in different countries, we provide two 
informative tables for the reader.  
 
Table 6: Comparison network properties based on 2018 statistics - expressed in percent of Norwegian value 
 NO DN FI SE ES IT IR PT UK 
  
 Abs. Count 
 
In percent of reference value from Norway 
# of Airports:   
Dom. (total) 47 19 36 64 79 83 6 40 126 
 
Dom. with direct link to Europ. 
 
11 
 
55 
 
109 
 
155 
 
282 
 
291 
 
55 
 
55 
 
318 
Europ. with direct link to Dom. 95 132 94 137 209 186 148 137 264 
Dom. with direct link to Intercon. 2 100 50 150 600 800 150 200 700 
Intercon. with direct link to Dom. 
 
13 285 215 162 677 662 215 346 1 154 
# of Airlines on _ city-pairs:          
Dom.  5 120 60 180 220 240 20 160 280 
Europ. 33 133 82 136 212 218 91 139 215 
Intercon. 
 
# of _ citypairs served: 
Dom. 
Europ. 
Intercont  
6 
 
 
126 
203 
13 
333 
 
 
10 
92 
292 
83 
 
 
17 
52 
215 
250 
 
 
41 
116 
169 
900 
 
 
138 
639 
1 169 
983 
 
 
133 
564 
1 315 
267 
 
 
2 
109 
277 
350 
 
 
26 
141 
446 
1 267 
 
 
148 
710 
2 123 
Note: ’XXX’ = lowest deviation from Norwegian statistics / most comparable to Norwegian case (all else equal) 
First, Table 6 presents some key network properties of the different Air Transport Systems. The 
statistics are provided in absolute values for Norway (NO) but are expressed in percentage of the 
respective Norwegian value for all other countries. Referring to the first statistics, the number of 
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domestic Airports in 2018 (‘# of Airports: Dom. (total)’), which means that only the United Kingdom 
had more active airports (26% more) in their domestic system than Norway. All other countries have 
considerable fewer airports in their domestic network. 
We next compare how the domestic airports are connected to Europe. In an ‘outbound’ perspective, 
we find that only Denmark, Ireland, and Portugal have fewer domestic airports that have direct links 
to Europe than Norway. This finding, however, has to be interpreted relative to the total number of 
domestic airports in the countries’ networks.  
Assessed from the ‘inbound’ view, we see that almost all other countries link to more European 
destinations. Only Finland connects to approximately the same number of European destinations. The 
number of airlines serving that segment correlates with the link statistics. 
In terms of intercontinental links, we find Norway to be a distinct case. First, we see that Norway has 
‘centralized’ its intercontinental operations as have Denmark, Finland, Sweden, and Ireland. However, 
in terms of number of intercontinental destinations served, Norway trails in the group with a large 
margin. The second ‘weakest’ integrated country is Sweden (162% of Norwegian value), whereas the 
highest value is reached by the UK. 
Concerning the number of airlines operating different route types, we find that Norway in general has 
fewer airlines involved than most benchmark countries. Once corrected for the number of domestic 
airports, Norway is clearly trailing the group for all route types. From a domestic perspective, Norway 
is most comparable to Denmark in terms of number of airlines operating in the domestic network. We 
realized, however, that the Danish domestic network is of considerably smaller size. If we focus on 
countries that have a more comparable quantity of domestic airports, such as Italy and the UK, we find 
that they have considerably more airlines operating their network. 
We finally assess the network’s degree of integration, as proxied by the number of city-pairs served. 
We see that Norway has a relatively high number of domestic city-pairs when compared to the 
benchmark group. Only Spain and Italy have notably more domestic city-pairs. If we set the statistics 
in relation to the absolute number of domestic airports in the network, Norway turns out to have a 
relatively low degree of domestic network integration. We calculate the theoretically maximum 
number of city-pairs in the networks (𝑛 ∗ (𝑛 − 1)/2; where ′𝑛′ denotes the number of airports in the 
network). The resulting value for a ‘fully integrated network’ for Norway is 1,081 city-pairs. Hence, 126 
operated city-pairs reflect approximately 12% of the maximum possible value. We relate this value to 
a pronounced ‘hub-and-spoke’ network structure. In terms of integration with the European and 
Intercontinental network, we find that Norway is weaker integrated than most of the benchmark 
countries, most notably in the intercontinental context. 
Table 7 addresses some supply side statistics in more detail and allows a comparison in relation to the 
countries’ population sizes. The numbers for the benchmark countries are expressed in percentage of 
the Norwegian reference value again.  
The statistics indicate that supply in the Norwegian domestic network is rather strong compared to 
the other countries. Only the considerably higher populated countries of Spain, Italy and the UK show 
bigger absolute supply numbers, but fail to reach the level of Norway in a per capita perspective. In 
the European perspective, we find again that Norway is trailing the field in absolute numbers. Once 
corrected for national population however, the numbers indicate also for this segment a rather high 
supply in Norway. Only Denmark and Ireland achieve higher per capita supply values. For the 
intercontinental segment, we find in absolute numbers and from a per-capita perspective that Norway 
has the lowest supply numbers of all countries in the sample.  
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Table 7: Comparison of Supply statistics based on 2018 statistics - expressed in percent of Norwegian value 
 NO DN FI SE ES IT IR PT UK 
  
 Abs. Count 
 
In percent of reference value from Norway 
population size 
 
# of flights on _ city-pairs: 
5 258 000 109 104 190 888 1 152 91 196 1 255 
Total 417 000 68 45 82 341 262 62 86 438 
Domestic  233 000 13 18 46 156 105 1 25 128 
European 179 000  134 74 126 535 420 129 150 708 
Intercontinental 
 
5 000 318 294 221 2 051 1 906 521 663 5 213 
# of seats on _ city-pairs:          
Total 53 937 000 79 51 90 453 339 81 109 577 
Domestic 24 695 000 12 19 47 201 158 1 27 121 
European 27 750 000 128 69 122 610 436 134 160 747 
Intercontinental 1 492 000 279 263 203 1 696 1 526 440 512 4 970 
          
# of seats on ‘Top-5’ _ city-pairs          
Dom. 2 226 051 23 27 48 104 76 4 39 47 
Europ. 1 412 680 122 82 125 121 99 112 94 146 
Intercon. 231 771 141 148 146 406 397 237 188 1 084 
Note: ’XXX’ = lowest deviation from Norwegian statistics / most comparable to Norwegian case (all else equal) 
Finally, we compare the aggregated volume of supply provided by the ‘top-five’ city-pairs for all 
countries in the sample. We see that the five largest Norwegian domestic routes by far outperform 
most of the other countries. Only Spain reaches comparable values, fostered by strong supply on the 
domestic routes between Madrid, Barcelona, and the Baleares. In terms of ‘top-five’ European routes, 
we see that the values across the countries are more homogenous than for the domestic routes. For 
the intercontinental routes, we find that the ‘largest’ Norwegian city-pairs are of considerably lower 
size than the ‘top-five’ routes of the other countries.  
To summarize this section on the comparison of network properties and supply statistics among the 
sample countries, we notice the following key aspects. The Norwegian domestic network consists of a 
comparably higher number of airports. The level of supply in the domestic network can be considered 
high, especially if the overall population size is considered. The number of airlines operating this 
domestic network is low relative to the number of airports. The network integration (in terms of 
number of destinations) to Europe is lower than in most other countries. In addition, services to 
European destinations are concentrated in relatively few Norwegian airports. Once corrected for 
population size, aggregated supply statistics on European city-pairs appears to be rather high. The 
intercontinental segment is less pronounced in Norway compared to the benchmark countries. 
Overall, the number of airlines operating in all three segments seem low, compared to the other 
countries in the sample. 
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4.3.2 Level of market concentration 
In order to compare the concentration levels in different countries, we run separate analyses with 
respect to domestic, European and intercontinental routes/city-pairs. In each category, we assign the 
yearly seat statistic of each individual route to one out of four groups. If a city-pair has a HHI score 
below 4,000, all seats available on this city-pair are assigned to Group 1 in the pie-charts below. A city-
pair’s seats are assigned to Group 2 if it’s HHI score is between 4,000 and 6,000 (Group 3 6,000–8,000; 
Group 4 above 8,000). We thereby aggregate all ‘available seats’ of a country into the four groups. We 
then finally visualizes market concentration as the shares of all ‘available seats in a country’ that fall 
into each of the four groups. By this approach, information on the market concentration of each route 
as well as their ‘overall importance’ are taken into account. We regard this method to be superior to a 
crude aggregation of statistics on a national level, where a set of monopoly routes operated by 
different airlines might well trigger the HHI to indicate competition where in reality none exists. 
Figure 10 presents the results for the domestic market. We see that for Norway, the share of seats on 
routes with HHI scores below 4,000 is zero, simply because no such routes existed in 2018. Comparing 
with the other countries, we see that only Italy, Spain, and Portugal have routes with this relatively low 
degree of market concentration. The latter two countries in fact have a considerably large share of 
their overall domestic seats in such markets.  
 
Figure 10: Distribution of ‘available seats’ in percent per HHI score intervals - domestic city-pairs 2018 - comparison  
 
 
29 
 
If we focus on the group with the second lowest market concentration group (4,000 ≤ 𝛾 < 6,000), 
we see that approximately 75% of all seats in Norway fall in this category. This share is larger in none 
of the other countries. In fact, even if we add in the ‘below - 4000 shares’ of Italy, Spain and Portugal, 
the Norwegian domestic air transport system still appears to have comparably lower levels of 
concentration. Recall however that HHI scores around 5000 point to a market where only two airlines 
have substantial market shares.  
On the opposite end, we see that approximately 26% of all available seats in the Norwegian domestic 
system are supplied on routes with one dominating airline. Compared to the other countries, this share 
looks relatively small.  
In order to present the situation detached from any artificially set bounds of the grouping, we calculate 
the HHI score of the ‘average seat’ for the domestic market. We first multiply the seats of a city-pair 
with the route’s individual HHI score. We then aggregate the values for all routes and divide by the 
total number of seats in the domestic network. Table 8 provides the resulting HHI scores for the 
‘average seat’ in the domestic market of each country. 
 
Table 8: HHI-score for ‘average domestic seat’ 2018 
 NO DN FI SE ES IT IR PT UK 
 
          
HHI-score  6 377 7 327 7 784 7 372 5 744 7 998 10 000 6 490 8 635 
 
 
We find that Norway has the second lowest value in the table. Only Spain seems to have a less 
concentrated domestic market. In comparison with the Scandinavian countries, Norway’s HHI score is 
about 1,000 points lower. Note again that all the scores have been derived from individual route 
statistics. For Sweden, this implies that routes from ARN and BMA are considered independent. If, 
however, the airports ARN and BMA are treated as substitutes, multiple city-pair duplications are 
created. From this perspective, ‘Braathens Regional Aviation’, almost exclusively operating out of BMA, 
becomes a direct competitor for SK and DY, operating out of ARN, on multiple high-volume routes. The 
domestic HHI score of Sweden would decrease substantially.  
For Norway, the score of 6,377 reflects the duplications of large parts of the network (SK + DY), a minor 
amount of ‘larger’ monopoly routes (e.g. BDU-OSL, KSU-OSL) and a large quantity of ‘small’ monopoly 
routes (WF). If we calculate an aggregated reference score across all city-pairs in the sample—
irrespective of the country—we get a value of 7,101. Even thus still highly concentrated, the Norwegian 
domestic market seems to ‘outperform’ most of the benchmark countries.  
We calculate the HHI-score for the year 2008 and find a respective value for Norway of 7 050 points. 
This indicats a reduction in market concentration over the last decade.    
Figure 11 presents the results for the European city-pairs. We find for Norway that only 5 per cent of 
all seats are offered on routes with HHI scores below 4,000. Compared with the other countries, this 
is a relatively low value. On the other hand, Norway has a rather large share of seats that fall into 
Group 2. In total, the distributions shown in the figure suggest that Norway is most comparable to 
Sweden, Ireland, and the UK. Denmark and, most notably, Spain and Portugal seem to have less 
concentration on their European city-pairs.  
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Figure 11: Distribution of ‘available seats’ in percent per HHI score intervals - European city-pairs 2018 - comparison 
 
 
The findings presented in Table 9 confirm these results. We see that in the ‘average seat perspective’, 
Norway scores approximately at the level of Sweden and the UK. The Scandinavian neighbours of 
Denmark and Finland reach lower scores. The top countries, Spain and Portugal, score substantially 
lower than Norway. Compared to the domestic scores, we find European city-pair markets to be 
slightly less concentrated in general. Only Norway shows the opposite pattern with a lower score on 
domestic rather than on European city-pairs. If we derive a ‘European average score’, we find 6,775 
points as the reference value. Norway’s respective value for the year 2008 was 6 933 points; hence no 
major improvement in the last decade can be identified.   
 
Table 9: HHI-score for ‘average European seat’ 2018 
 NO DN FI SE ES IT IR PT UK 
 
          
HHI-score  6 962 6 402 6 587 6 998 5 750 7 585 6 879 5 963 7 031 
 
Finally, we turn towards the intercontinental city-pairs. Figure 12 gives the distributions, and we see 
that 39 per cent of Norway’s intercontinental city-pairs fall into the interval (6 000, 8 000]. Recall, 
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however, that only 13 intercontinental city-pairs existed in 2018. The share in Group 3, therefore, 
relates to only two observations—the city-pairs DXB-OSL and BKK-OSL. 
Figure 12: Distribution of ‘available seats’ in percent per HHI score intervals - Intercontinental city-pairs 2018 - comparison 
 
 
Overall, it appears that all Scandinavian countries as well as Portugal have rather concentrated 
intercontinental markets, while Spain and the UK, in particular, reach HHI scores indicating lower levels 
of market concentration. 
Table 10 shows that Norway, Denmark, and Finland have highly concentrated markets from the 
‘average seats perspective’. The same counts with reservation for Sweden. The remaining benchmark 
countries score better. The ‘average score’ across all city-pairs in 2018 is 6,872—this is substantially 
lower than the Norwegian value (9171). Here the comparably low market concentration on some high-
volume city-pairs (e.g. JFK-LHR: 3 800,000 seats, HHI score 2995; LAX-LHR: 2,016,000 seats, HHI score 
2443) strongly affects the average value. The historic Norwegian score for the year 2008 was 10 000 
points owing to only three monopoly routes in the database. 
Table 10: HHI-score for ‘average intercontinental seat’ 2018 
 NO DN FI SE ES IT IR PT UK 
 
          
HHI-score  9 171 9 149 9 252 8 559 6 467 7 589 7 628 8 380 6 201 
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One interesting implication comes to mind. We earlier found that all Scandinavian countries are better 
‘integrated’ in the intercontinental network than Norway. We derived this conclusion based on a count 
of the city-pairs served, flights offered, and seats available. Table 10, however, indicates that the 
‘average market concentration’ on intercontinental city-pairs to/from Scandinavia is almost equally 
high, irrespective of the specific Scandinavian country. The implication is that travellers starting their 
air journey for example from Denmark might have a larger choice set in terms of where they can fly to 
without an intermediate stop. Nevertheless, once they have decided on a specific intercontinental 
destination, they are likely to face a monopoly provider anyway. The pure number of destinations an 
airport/country is linked to might allow to proxy the level of network integration, directness of travel 
and, to some degree, generalized travel costs. Nevertheless, it seems to be a rather weak indicator for 
the level of market concentration.   
 
5. Discussion and Summary 
5.1 Overall market concentration and size of market 
In the overall picture, the analysis presented above yields that air transport markets in general are 
rather highly concentrated. Only very few individual routes in 2018 reached scores within a range so 
that USDOJ (2018) or the European Commission (2004) would define the respective market as 
‘moderately concentrated’. In fact, only eight out of 5,600 city-pairs considered in this analysis have 
HHI scores below 2,500.12 Most of them are European city-pairs linking population centres in central 
Europe with holiday destinations in Spain. Additional 431 city-pairs score below 5,000 points. The 
remaining some 5,160 city-pair in this analysis have market concentrations above 5,000. The ‘average’ 
HHI score in the sample (route-based and across all city-pairs) is 8,608, while the ‘median’ score is 
10,000. Once weighted by the number of ‘available seats’, the HHI score of the ‘average’ route is 8,658. 
Based on this finding, we conclude that even if not desirable from a customer perspective, highly 
concentrated air transport markets display the norm rather than being an exception. It is, therefore, 
natural to expect that the Norwegian Air Transport System would be characterized by high levels of 
market concentration as well.  
The existence of a correlation between the level of market concentration in a specific market and its 
respective level of demand is widely assumed in the academic literature. The direction of this 
correlation, however, is open to debate. Proponents of the ‘entry affection effect’ of market growth 
argue that the higher the demand on a specific route, the more profit would a potential monopolist 
reap. Consequently, the incentive for additional airlines to join the market increases and the market 
concentration decreases. Oliveira and Oliveira (2018), for example, empirically determine this negative 
association between demand and market concentration for the Brazilian Air Transport market. 
Opponents of this view claim that the economics of traffic density in air transport networks in general 
favours dominant airlines and that market growth will even further foster their competitive advantage. 
Consequently, market concentration is positively correlated to market size. 
To assess the relationship, we estimate the Pearson’s correlation coefficient between HHI scores and 
the number of available seats (as proxy for demand) on the route level across all observations in the 
dataset. The resulting correlation coefficient has a value of -0.44 and is significant. The results suggest 
a weak to moderate negative correlation, meaning that HHI scores are likely to drop as routes grow.   
                                                          
12 For further details concerning these routes, see Attachment 4.  
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Figure 13 investigates the same assumption and plots all 5,600 city-pairs’ HHI scores against their 
seating statistics. No clear, strong relationship can visually be identified. The dataset contains both 
multiple ‘small’ routes subject to competition and a few ‘large’ city-pairs that are monopoly routes. If 
it is possible to derive a general conclusion from the chart at all it is that the likelihood of a city-pair 
being a monopoly market declines dramatically once the available seat statistics become larger than 
1,000,000.  
On the other hand, the graph visualizes that high capacity numbers are not necessarily mandatory to 
achieve relatively lower levels of market concentration. Several reasons might motivate airlines to 
operate in low-demand markets in parallel with their competitors13.  
First, an airline’s network might be structured in a way that one hub-airport requires intensive ‘feed’ 
(short-haul routes). If, in addition, the airline can yield a monopoly rent on some high-volume routes 
originating at that hub (e.g. long-haul routes), the airline might be willing to enter ‘low-profit feeder’ 
routes. In such a case, the airline does not compete ‘over’ the specific feeder route, but their entire 
network structure.  
Figure 13: Available seats on city-pairs entire dataset vs. HHI-scores 2018 
 
 
Second, temporal coordination in networks might cause airlines to operate on routes that, seen in 
isolation, only cover costs. If an airline, for example, serves domestic morning and evening waves (e.g. 
to/from OSL), which are supposedly high-profit routes, it might be willing to utilize its aircraft in ‘small’ 
competitive markets between the two peak periods. As long as revenue of those operations is larger 
than the costs of parking the aircraft between the domestic waves, airlines will have an incentive to 
engage in such markets.  
                                                          
13 Note that our analysis aggregates on the city-pair level and we allow rather ‘small’ routes to enter the analysis. 
This might lead to a situation where an airline ’𝑎1’ serves a specific city-pair only once every Monday and an 
airline ‘𝑎2’ serves the same city-pair once every Thursday. The graph would then show this city-pair as a ‘small’ 
city-pair with HHI scores around 5 000. To test for the impact of such ‘low’ volume routes on our results, we 
deleted all city-pairs from the analysis that have not been served at least once a day. The resulting correlation 
coefficient as well as the implications from Figure 13 did not change substaintially.    
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As of today, only eight city-pairs exceed the aforementioned capacity threshold of 1,000,000 seats per 
year in Norway. Six of them are domestic routes while the other two link to European destination. They 
are all already subject to some degree of competition (HHI-scores typically around 5,000), as are all 
Norwegian city-pairs showing seats statistics above 500,000 (in total 22 city-pairs).  
However, we note that 289 city-pairs in the overall sample reach HHI scores below 4,000 (requiring at 
least three airlines with considerable market shares) and that the average seat-statistic on those city-
pairs is around 480,000. If we disregard all presumably ‘holiday city-pairs’, the seat statistics increases 
to 550,000. In this respect, Norwegian high-demand city-pairs seem large enough to attract additional 
airlines. 
Nevertheless, we also find some convincing arguments as to why potential market entry on those 
routes is less likely. We notice the specific hub-and-spoke nature of the Norwegian Air Transport 
network, with OSL as the central, national hub-airport and, inter alia, TRD, BOO and TOS as secondary, 
‘regional sub-hubs’. The latter once serve among other as transfer points for air journeys between a 
large set of rather small airports and for example OSL (e.g. RET-BOO-OSL). This, however, implies that 
a substantial amount of demand is ‘generated on’ routes connecting OSL with the ‘regional sub-hubs’. 
In addition, some demand between rather large Norwegian cities (e.g. Bodø-Ålesund) is due to the 
existing network structure channelled through OSL. As a consequence of both aspects, we can assume 
that traffic (seat statistics) on some of the ‘largest’ Norwegian routes (e.g. BOO-OSL) is much higher 
than the real underlying demand for travel between the cities of Bodø and Oslo.  
This is relevant in our context because a potential newcomer that establishes isolated services 
between the airports BOO and OSL will most likely be an attractive supplier for the demand fraction 
that wants to travel between Bodø and Oslo (origin-destination context). Passengers that use BOO 
and/or OSL as a transfer point, on the other hand, are likely to prefer travelling the entire journey with 
some established airline that offers services ‘out of one hand’, meaning transfers within the same 
airline/alliance. In order to attract such customers and reach the same network coverage, a potential 
newcomer would have to file cooperation agreements with established airlines (e.g. codeshare 
agreements) or ‘duplicate’ large parts of the network with own services. Whether or not total ‘network 
demand’ is high enough to facilitate an additional network duplicate seems uncertain. These prospects 
might deter potential newcomers.  
Another interpretation of this aspect is as follows. We earlier referred to 289 city-pairs with HHI-values 
below 4,000 and an average capacity of 480,000 seats. If a substantial share of those routes serve 
‘real’, direct origin-destination demand and hence are not part of a longer, indirect travel path, then 
the 480,000-seat threshold cannot be applied to the Norwegian setting. Substantially larger volumes 
might be necessary to attract an additional airline into individual Norwegian city-pairs without 
engaging the entire network. 
In short, the data used in this analysis reveals that air transport markets are highly concentrated across 
all countries investigated. The correlation between market size and level of market concentration in 
our dataset is weakly to moderately negative. Based on this relationship and the distinct network 
structure in Norway, we do not find overwhelming reason for additional airlines to enter the 
Norwegian network structure on a large scale.  
 
 
 
35 
 
5.2 The Domestic perspective 
In a distinct domestic perspective, the lowest concentrated domestic route in the sample is IBZ-MAD 
with a HHI score of 2,679. In contrast, the least concentrated domestic route in Norway scores 4,750. 
This makes BGO-SVG the 38th least concentrated domestic route in the sample (sample size 775). Since 
some additional high-volume routes in Norway have relatively low HHI scores, the Norwegian domestic 
market achieves lower HHI scores than most of the benchmark countries (once weighted for the 
number of seats offered). Here the wide scale network duplication of DY and SK lowers the score, while 
a large amount of low-volume and monopoly city-pairs tends to increase the score (mainly WF routes). 
Over the last decade, growth of DY has led to a more even distribution of market shares, causing the 
HHI-score to decrease. In comparison with the benchmark countries, the Norwegian domestic market 
can be described as relatively moderate, but still as highly concentrated (- expressed in absolute HHI 
values). 
It seems worth spending a few additional words on the network structure and competition in this 
domestic context. As initially discussed, the analysis is limited to direct routes. We briefly elaborated 
on the potential competition between alternative indirect travel paths. We further claimed that  
Norwegian domestic network is in large parts organized in a stringent hub and spoke fashion and that 
this contributes to the making of some of the OSL routes to high-volume city-pairs. Direct links 
between so-called spoke cities, however, represent attractive alternatives for traveller that otherwise 
would be ‘forced’ to transfer at OSL. Operators of such direct routes can be considered to compete 
with the established hub and spoke airlines in an origin-destination-context. 
Therefore, we argue that new or strengthened spoke-spoke routes, even in case of ‘monopoly routes’, 
can contribute to the reduction of overall market concentration in Norway. Instead of trying to 
motivate an additional airline to enter the established hub- and spoke structure, one might want to 
evaluate this alternative approach. One of many challenges facing this potential tactic is the 
presumably low demand on spoke-spoke city-pairs vs. the need to provide acceptable frequency levels. 
Proceeding this idea would require to motivate airlines operating new, relatively small aircraft, such 
as Embraer E 190, to enter the network. Alternatively, aircraft types like the ones used in PSO contracts 
could be employed on such spoke-spoke routes. We underline that these views have to be supported 
by future research in order to add substance. 
A somewhat related question to this aspect and the discussion in section 5.1 is how a potential market 
newcomer would integrate its new domestic routes with the already existing network. Having in mind 
the relatively ‘low’ market concentration in the Norwegian domestic network (compared to the 
benchmark countries), it appears somewhat uncertain whether or not a newcomer would at the outset 
take the risk to operate and compete on domestic routes independent of its existing network. This 
leaves WF as the only ‘established’ airline that could enter the competition based on their already 
existing infrastructure within the domestic network. All other potential entrants would have to enter 
the market from the ‘outside’, most likely linked with some already established Norwegian–Europe 
city-pair(s). Recent studies on how airline networks typically grow are unfortunately not available. It 
is, therefore, hardly possible to assess the likelihood of the different scenarios. Further, it is highly 
uncertain how the eventual process of market entry would proceed in a network perspective.  
To summarize this section, we identify the Norwegian domestic network to be highly concentrated. 
Compared to the benchmarking countries, however, market concentration appears rather moderate. 
Set in isolation, this finding does not argue in favour of additional airlines imminently engaging in the 
Norwegian domestic network in a large scale. We propose to see competition in terms of the 
coexistence of direct and indirect travel paths.  
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5.3 The European/Intercontinental perspective 
Focusing on European city-pairs first, we find that the aggregated Norwegian-European market is 
slightly more concentrated than its domestic counterpart. This is in contrast to the relationship in all 
other benchmark countries. Moreover, it opposes the suspicion expressed at times that the 
international segment in general has outperformed the domestic segment in terms of the degree of 
competition. The results of our analysis do not support this claim.  
We discovered that nine out of the ten Norwegian city-pairs with the lowest HHI scores are European 
city-pairs. Traveller on these specific routes may substantially benefit from competition. Irrespective 
of this finding, the aggregated Norwegian domestic market is still characterized by lower levels of 
concentration once adjusted for travel behaviour (as proxied by seats available). This means that the 
‘average’ traveller on a European route faces more concentrated markets than the ‘average’ traveller 
in the domestic network.  
The perception of European city-pair markets as being less concentrated than domestic city-pairs 
might be related to the difference in the number of airlines operating in both segments or to the sheer 
number of destinations served. The analysis reveals that most European city-pairs are served by only 
one airline and hence are monopoly markets. The allegedly higher degree of competition in the 
European market is thus related to competition between different destinations but not necessarily to 
competition between airlines. Whether this type of competition translates into relatively lower prices 
for customers might be questionable.  
Taking the overall network structure and the necessity of indirect travel paths into perspective again, 
adding an interesting facet to the discussion. Even though some European city-pairs have relatively 
low levels of concentration, not all travellers are able to benefit directly from it. That is, travellers 
starting their journey at Norwegian domestic spoke airports without direct EU-links have to transfer at 
least once within Norway. Such passengers will often try to travel the entire path on board the same 
airline to avoid disutility cause by transfers between different airlines14. This means that a large 
number of travellers might not consider other operators as viable alternatives, a circumstance that 
domestic airlines can potentially capitalize on. On the other hand, travellers starting/ending their trip 
at OSL, for example, can directly benefit from the situation. 
From the intercontinental perspective, we find Norwegian city-pair markets to be highly concentrated, 
which is in line with the results of most of the benchmark countries. Due to the low number of existing 
intercontinental city-pairs for Norway, a detailed discussion of the market concentration levels is 
obsolete. We believe that the future should be about strengthening (i.e. increase demand on) existing 
links and extending the intercontinental network (number of direct links to/from Norway), rather than 
trying to increase competition on existing routes. As of today, volumes of on average 115,000 seats 
(13 city-pairs) seem too low to realistically expect substantial competition on the route level. New links 
are needed to generate ‘feed’ into the intercontinental routes, either by ‘diverting’ Norwegian transfer 
passengers back from other European hub-airports or by attracting foreign citizens on intercontinental 
journeys to transfer in Norway. Both scenarios come with considerable challenges that are beyond the 
scope of this note to describe. An alternative approach that could be considered in the medium run is 
to stimulate the establishment of new intercontinental routes linking Norwegian spoke cities directly 
with intercontinental destinations, utilizing modern narrow-body aircrafts. Such links then might also 
have indirect effects on the market concentration in the domestic network. 
                                                          
14 For example, baggage claim and re-check in, financial risk of missing connection etc.  
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5.4 Summary 
In summary, we have conducted an analysis of the concentration levels in Norwegian Air Transport 
markets using the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index as the measure. We calculate the index on the city-pair 
level and aggregate for the Domestic, European, and Intercontinental segments. We have compared 
the resulting concentration levels for Norway with those of the respective markets of Denmark, 
Finland, Sweden, Spain, Italy, Ireland, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. We found that air passenger 
transport markets are generally highly concentrated. We further derive that the ‘average’ 
concentration level in the Norwegian domestic market is rather low in direct comparison to the 
benchmark countries. Moreover, we conclude that concentration levels in the European and in the 
intercontinental markets show a more diverse picture. 
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6. Attachments 
 
 
Attachment 1: 
Airlines; IATA – codes and names 
0B Blue Air Aviation SA LO LOT - Polish Airlines 
2L Helvetic Airways LS Jet2.com Limited 
2N NextJet AB LTR Lufttransport AS 
2Q Avitrans Nordic AB LX SWISS 
2W Moldavia Airlines M3 North Flying A/S 
4U Germanwings NB Skypower Express 
5N Smartavia NWG AirWing 
5W Astraeus Ltd. NY Air Iceland Connect 
6F Primera Air Nordic OK Czech Airlines a.s., CSA 
6S Saudi Gulf Airlines OS Austrian 
7R RusLine OU Croatia Airlines 
8N Regional Air Services OV SalamAir 
A3 Aegean Airlines OZ Asiana Airlines 
AB airberlin PC Pegasus Hava Tasimaciligi A.S. 
AC Air Canada PF Primera Air Scandinavia A/S 
AF Air France PK Pakistan International Airlines 
AY Finnair Q9 Kuwait National Airways t/a Wataniya Airways 
BA British Airways QI Cimber Air A.S. 
BD Cambodia Bayon Airlines Limited QR Qatar Airways 
BE FlyBE R3 Joint Stock Company Aircompany Yakutia 
BM flybmi R6 DOT LT 
BT Air Baltic RC Atlantic Airways Faroe Islands 
C0 One Caribbean Ltd S4 SATA International Servicios Et. Trans Aereos, S.A 
CF City Airlines S7 S7 Airlines 
CO Cobalt SK Scandinavian Airlines System 
D8 Norwegian Air International Ltd SM AIR CAIRO 
DC Braathens Regional Airways AB SN Brussels Airlines N.V. 
DE Condor Flugdienst SU Aeroflot 
DX Danish Air Transport A/S T3 Eastern Airways 
DY Norwegian Air Shuttle A.S TB TUI fly 
EB Wamos Air S.A. TG Thai Airways International 
EK Emirates TK Turkish Airlines 
ET Ethiopian Airlines TP TAP Portugal 
EW Eurowings U2 easyJet 
FI Icelandair UA United Airlines 
FR Ryanair US US Airways 
H9 Himalaya Airlines UU Air Austral 
HS Heli Securite Helicopter Airline VF FlyViking AS 
I2 Iberia Express VY Vueling Airlines 
IB Iberia W2 FlexFlight ApS 
IZ Arkia - Israeli Airlines Ltd W6 Wizz Air 
J7 Denim Air ACMI B.V. W9 Wizz Air UK Limited 
JP Adria Airways WF Wideroe'S Flyveselskap A/S 
JU Air Serbia WU Jetways Airlines Limited 
JZ Jubba Airways   
KF Air Belgium SA   
KL KLM Royal Dutch Airlines   
L5 Atlantique Air   
LF Corporate Flight Management, Inc   
LH Lufthansa   
LM Loganair Limited   
Note: Airlines operating to/from Norway in period 2008 – 2018; source: SRS-database 
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Attachment 2 / page 1: 
Airports; IATA – codes and names 
AAL Aalborg, DK CDG Paris-De Gaulle, FR HOV Orsta/Volda, NO 
AAR Aarhus, DK CFU Kerkyra, GR HRG Hurghada, EG 
ABZ Aberdeen, SC, GB CGN Cologne-Bonn, DE HVG Honningsvag, NO 
ACE Lanzarote, ES CHQ Chania, Crete, GR IAH Houston-Intercontinental, TX, US 
ADB Izmir, TR CIA Rome-Ciampino, IT IBZ Ibiza, ES 
ADD Addis Ababa, ET CMF Chambery, FR ICN Seoul, KR 
AER Sochi, SF, RU CPH Copenhagen, DK IEV Kiev-Metro, UA 
AES Alesund, NO CRL Brussels, BE INN Innsbruck, AT 
AGA Agadir, MA CTA Catania, IT INV Inverness, SC, GB 
AGP Malaga, ES DBV Dubrovnik, HR ISB Islamabad, PK 
AHO Alghero, IT DLM Dalaman, TR IST Istanbul, TR 
AJA Ajaccio, Corsica, FR DME Moscow-Domodedovo, CF, RU JFK New York-JFK, NY, US 
ALC Alicante, ES DOH Doha, QA JSI Skiathos, GR 
ALF Alta, NO DTM Dortmund, DE JTR Santorini, GR 
AMS Amsterdam, NL DUB Dublin, IE KBP Kiev, UA 
ANX Andenes, NO DUS Duesseldorf, DE KBV Krabi, TH 
ARN Stockholm-Arlanda, SE DXB Dubai, AE KEF Reykjavik, IS 
ATH Athens, GR EBJ Esbjerg, DK KGS Kos, GR 
AYT Antalya, TR EDI Edinburgh, SC, GB KKN Kirkenes, NO 
BCN Barcelona, ES EFL Kefalonia, GR KOI Kirkwall, Orkney Is., SC, GB 
BDU Bardufoss, NO EIN Eindhoven, NL KRK Krakow, PL 
BEG Belgrade, RS EMA East Midlands, EN, GB KRN Kiruna, SE 
BER Berlin, DE EVE Evenes, NO KRS Kristiansand, NO 
BGO Bergen, NO EWR Newark, NJ, US KSD Karlstad, SE 
BGY Milan-Orio Serio, IT FAE Faroe Islands, DK KSU Kristiansund, NO 
BHX Birmingham, EN, GB FAO Faro, PT KTT Kittila, FI 
BIA Bastia, Corsica, FR FCO Rome-Da Vinci, IT KTW Katowice, PL 
BIO Bilbao, ES FDE Forde, NO KUN Kaunas, LT 
BIQ Biarritz, FR FLL Fort Lauderdale, FL, US KWI Kuwait, KW 
BJF Batsfjord, NO FLR Florence, IT LAS Las Vegas, NV, US 
BKK Bangkok, TH FMM Memmingen, DE LAX Los Angeles, CA, US 
BLE Borlange, SE FNC Madeira, PT LCA Larnaca, CY 
BLL Billund, DK FRA Frankfurt, DE LCJ Lodz, PL 
BLQ Bologna, IT FRO Floro, NO LCY London, EN, GB 
BMA Stockholm-Bromma, SE FUE Fuerteventura, ES LED St. Petersburg, NF, RU 
BNN Bronnoysund, NO GDN Gdansk, PL LGW London-Gatwick, EN, GB 
BOD Bordeaux, FR GLA Glasgow, SC, GB LHE Lahore, PK 
BOJ Burgas, BG GNB Grenoble, FR LHR London-Heathrow, EN, GB 
BOO Bodo, NO GOT Goteborg, SE LIS Lisbon, PT 
BOS Boston, MA, US GRO Gerona, ES LJU Ljubljana, SI 
BRE Bremen, DE GVA Geneva, CH LKL Lakselv, NO 
BRS Bristol, EN, GB GZP Gazipasa, TR LKN Leknes, NO 
BRU Brussels, BE HAA Hasvik, NO LLA Lulea, SE 
BTS Bratislava, SK HAM Hamburg, DE LPA Gran Canaria, ES 
BUD Budapest, HU HAU Haugesund, NO LPI Linkoping, SE 
BVA Paris, FR HEL Helsinki, FI LPL Liverpool, EN, GB 
BVG Berlevag, NO HER Irakleion, GR LRH La Rochelle, FR 
BZG Bydgoszcz, PL HFT Hammerfest, NO LSI Shetland Islands-Sum, SC, GB 
BZR Beziers, FR HHN Hahn, DE LTN London-Luton, EN, GB 
CAG Cagliari, IT CDG Paris-De Gaulle, FR LUZ Lublin, PL 
Note: Airports linked by non-stop flight with Norwegian airport in period 2008 – 2018  
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LYR Longyearbyen, NO RAK Marrakech, MA TSF Venice-Treviso, IT 
LYS Lyon, FR RET Rost, NO TXL Berlin-Tegel, DE 
MAD Madrid, ES REU Reus, ES TZL Tuzla, BA 
MAH Menorca, ES RHO Rhodes, GR TZX Trabzon, TR 
MAN Manchester, EN, GB RIX Riga, LV VAR Varna, BG 
MCO Orlando, FL, US RJK Rijeka, HR VAW Vardoe, NO 
MEH Mehamn, NO RKV Reykjavik-City, IS VBY Visby, SE 
MIA Miami, FL, US RNN Bornholm, DK VCE Venice, IT 
MJF Mosjoen, NO RRS Roros, NO VDB Fagernes, NO 
MJV Murcia, ES RVK Roervik, NO VDS Vadso, NO 
MLA Malta, MT RYG Rygge, NO VIE Vienna, AT 
MMK Murmansk, NF, RU RZE Rzeszow, PL VKO Moscow-Vnukovo, CF, RU 
MOL Molde, NO SAW Sabiha Gokcen, TR VLC Valencia, ES 
MQN Mo I Rana, NO SDN Sandane, NO VNO Vilnius, LT 
MRS Marseille, FR SJJ Sarajevo, BA VRN Verona, IT 
MUC Munich, DE SJU San Juan, PR, US VRY Vaeroy, NO 
MXP Milan-Malpensa, IT SKE Skien, NO VXO Vaxjo, SE 
NAP Naples, IT SKG Thessaloniki, GR WAW Warsaw, PL 
NCE Nice, FR SKN Stokmarknes, NO WMI Nowy Dwor Mazowiecki, PL 
NCL Newcastle, EN, GB SKP Skopje, MK WRO Wroclaw, PL 
NRN Nordrhein-Westfale, DE SOF Sofia, BG XCR Chalons Sur Marne, FR 
NRT Tokyo-Narita, JP SOG Sogndal, NO YYZ Toronto, ON, CA 
NTB Notodden, NO SOJ Sorkjosen, NO ZAD Zadar, HR 
NVK Narvik, NO SPC Santa Cruz La Palma, ES ZAG Zagreb, HR 
NYO Nykoping, SE SPU Split, HR ZRH Zurich, CH 
OAK Oakland, CA, US SRP Stord, NO   
OLA Orland, NO SSH Sharm el-Sheikh, EG   
OLB Olbia, IT SSJ Sandnessjoen, NO   
ORY Paris-Orly, FR STN London-Stansted, EN, GB   
OSD Ostersund, SE SVG Stavanger, NO   
OSL Oslo, NO SVJ Svolvaer, NO   
OSY Namsos, NO SVO Moscow-Sheremetyevo, CF, RU   
OTP Bucharest, RO SVQ Sevilla, ES   
OUL Oulu, FI SWF New York, NY, US   
PDL Ponta Delgada, PT SXF Berlin-Schoenefeld, DE   
PFO Paphos, CY SZG Salzburg, AT   
PHL Philadelphia, PA, US SZY Szymany, PL   
PIK Glasgow-Prestwick, SC, GB SZZ Szczecin, PL   
PLQ Palanga, LT TFS Tenerife-Reinasofia, ES   
PMF Parma, IT THN Trollhattan, SE   
PMI Palma de Mallorca, ES TIA Tirana, AL   
PMO Palermo, IT TIV Tivat, ME   
POZ Poznan, PL TLL Tallinn, EE   
PRG Prague, CZ TLN Toulon/Hyeres, FR   
PRN Pristina, RS TLV Tel Aviv-Yafo, IL   
PSA Pisa, IT TMP Tampere, FI   
PSR Pescara, IT TOS Tromso, NO   
PUY Pula, HR TPS Trapani, IT   
PVD Providence, RI, US TRD Trondheim, NO   
PVK Preveza/Lefkas, GR TRF Sandefjord, NO   
Note: Airports linked by non-stop flight with Norwegian airport in period 2008 – 2018 
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2018 
Flights  
 
2018 
1000’
Seats 
2018 2013 2014 2015 
AAL_OSL 7 181 9 370 4 741 6 088 4 686 8 717 8 750 5 019 5 160 1 434 69.6 
AAR_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 6 893 1 114 74.1 
ABZ_BGO 7 357 8 137 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 110 86.6 
ABZ_OSL    10 000 5 557 6 134 5 460 5 496 5 551 886 60.0 
ABZ_SVG 3 807 3 744 3 707 3 700 4 082 5 030 5 010 5 195 5 073 2 190 187.8 
ACE_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 56 10.5 
AES_ALC   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 76 14.1 
AES_AMS    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 162 105.0 
AES_BGO 10 000 8 726 6 025 6 828 7 349 6 553 6 724 6 711 6 423 2 579 238.7 
AES_FRO        10 000 10 000 71 2.8 
AES_GDN    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 570 126.8 
AES_KSU        10 000 10 000 259 10.1 
AES_KUN        10 000 10 000 208 46.0 
AES_OSL 5 059 5 024 5 117 5 110 5 075 5 037 5 022 5 013 5 013 5 799 926.3 
AES_TRD 10 000 8 332 5 470 9 033 10 000 10 000 10 000 8 359 7 579 1 238 104.3 
AGP_BGO 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 897 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 272 50.6 
AGP_HAU 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 124 23.4 
AGP_OSL 5 639 5 407 5 300 5 392 5 629 5 691 5 879 6 066 5 934 2 117 386.0 
AGP_SVG 10 000 10 000 6 026 5 429 10 000 10 000 10 000 6 348 10 000 204 37.9 
AGP_TRD 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 003 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 152 28.3 
AGP_TRF 10 000 10 000 5 072 5 014 5 004 5 038 5 021 5 320 5 408 460 86.4 
ALC_BGO 5 866 6 111 6 228 5 899 5 808 6 614 6 758 6 305 6 307 540 98.5 
ALC_BOO         10 000 70 12.4 
ALC_HAU 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 132 24.9 
ALC_KRS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 76 10.7 
ALC_OSL 5 024 5 308 5 054 5 067 5 163 5 104 5 292 5 240 5 320 2 386 434.0 
ALC_SVG 5 337 5 597 5 406 5 497 6 281 6 159 5 947 6 392 6 234 442 79.0 
ALC_TOS    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 62 11.5 
ALC_TRD 5 001 5 124 5 159 5 612 5 584 6 487 6 898 6 821 7 101 276 50.1 
ALC_TRF 10 000 6 261 5 060 5 000 5 037 5 479 5 024 5 853 5 319 710 133.4 
ALF_HFT 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 103 4.0 
ALF_KKN 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 579 22.8 
ALF_LKL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 158 6.4 
ALF_OSL 5 010 5 001 5 008 5 001 5 176 5 456 5 045 5 014 5 442 1 619 284.5 
ALF_SOJ    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 249 9.7 
ALF_TOS 5 022 3 449 3 397 3 782 3 714 3 420 3 368 3 072 5 028 2 940 190.5 
ALF_VDS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 660 25.7 
AMS_BGO 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 2 928 430.3 
AMS_KRS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 731 159.8 
AMS_OSL 4 785 5 156 5 301 5 247 5 154 4 738 4 543 4 399 4 409 6 060 875.8 
AMS_SVG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 3 229 349.2 
AMS_TRD 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 791 172.5 
AMS_TRF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 414 132.6 
ANX_BOO 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 892 35.1 
ANX_EVE 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 474 19.8 
ANX_SKN 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 76 3.0 
ANX_SVJ        10 000 10 000 756 29.5 
ANX_TOS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 271 49.8 
ARN_BGO 4 014 2 747 3 738 4 178 3 816 3 609 3 581 3 709 3 707 1 370 220.1 
ARN_BOO         10 000 60 7.3 
ARN_OSL 5 292 5 120 5 233 5 133 5 142 5 289 5 361 4 843 4 592 12 841 2261.7 
ARN_SVG  10 000 5 029 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 353 33.8 
ARN_TOS    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 314 49.0 
ARN_TRD 10 000 8 110 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 129 102.2 
ATH_OSL  10 000 10 000 10 000 5 015 5 391 3 734 6 361 5 016 406 71.2 
AYT_BGO 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 80 14.9 
AYT_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 777 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 378 70.4 
BCN_BGO 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 639 5 264 5 173 5 405 10 000 10 000 124 23.1 
BCN_OSL 5 509 5 295 5 123 4 240 4 234 4 636 4 820 4 987 5 078 2 012 361.1 
BCN_SVG   10 000 10 000 10 000 5 122 5 035 10 000 10 000 124 23.1 
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2018 
1000’
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2018 2013 2014 2015 
BCN_TRD      10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 124 23.1 
BDU_BOO  10 000 10 000     10 000 10 000 116 4.5 
BDU_OSL 8 796 9 402 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 890 351.5 
BEG_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 290 54.0 
BGO_BLL 10 000 10 000 5 082 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 966 229 14.1 
BGO_BOO 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 905 83.3 
BGO_BUD        10 000 10 000 172 31.0 
BGO_CDG         10 000 430 61.5 
BGO_CHQ 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 54 10.0 
BGO_CPH 7 306 6 909 7 066 7 253 7 206 6 731 6 359 7 000 7 130 4 078 602.0 
BGO_DBV 10 000 10 000  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 52 9.7 
BGO_FAE   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 264 34.4 
BGO_FCO 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 124 23.1 
BGO_FDE 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 870 33.9 
BGO_FRO 10 000 10 000 5 360 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 2 640 103.2 
BGO_GDN 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 460 10 000 636 119.8 
BGO_GLA        10 000 10 000 64 3.2 
BGO_GOT 10 000 6 619 10 000     10 000 10 000 108 8.4 
BGO_HAM 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000     5 440 170 20.6 
BGO_HEL         10 000 460 52.4 
BGO_HOV   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 371 14.5 
BGO_INV         10 000 184 8.6 
BGO_KEF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 015 5 021 5 003 5 005 5 579 414 69.9 
BGO_KRK 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 268 49.8 
BGO_KRS 5 753 7 918 6 186 6 842 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 3 126 239.2 
BGO_KSU 6 798 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 959 109.7 
BGO_KTW    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 208 47.8 
BGO_KUN        10 000 10 000 208 37.4 
BGO_LGW 7 073 7 224 10 000 6 413 7 851 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 348 250.7 
BGO_LPA 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 186 34.6 
BGO_LPL         10 000 80 9.0 
BGO_LSI 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000    10 000 10 000 50 1.7 
BGO_MAD         10 000 124 23.1 
BGO_MAN   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 138 21.2 
BGO_MOL 5 005 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 875 93.9 
BGO_MUC         10 000 118 13.5 
BGO_NCE 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 940 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 140 26.0 
BGO_ORY 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 124 23.1 
BGO_OSL 5 000 5 000 5 000 5 003 5 008 5 001 5 006 5 018 5 024 16 629 2862.4 
BGO_PRG 10 000 10 000   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 254 47.2 
BGO_RIX 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 416 5 873 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 244 43.9 
BGO_SOG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 177 45.9 
BGO_SVG 4 780 4 974 5 386 5 135 4 910 4 865 4 754 4 724 4 750 7 748 1052.1 
BGO_SWF        10 000 10 000 171 32.3 
BGO_SXF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 310 57.7 
BGO_SZZ      10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 208 37.4 
BGO_TOS 6 321 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 6 704 1 485 153.8 
BGO_TRD 5 717 5 057 5 264 5 327 5 646 5 542 5 454 5 390 5 065 4 507 628.3 
BGO_TRF 10 000 10 000 5 044 5 000 5 029 6 442 10 000 10 000 10 000 3 485 281.3 
BGO_WAW 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 210 37.8 
BGY_TRF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000    10 000 10 000 270 51.0 
BIA_OSL         10 000 50 9.3 
BJF_BVG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 554 21.6 
BJF_MEH 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 307 12.0 
BJF_VAW 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 806 31.4 
BJF_VDS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 561 21.9 
BKK_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 6 841 6 032 6 332 6 518 6 669 6 770 830 280.1 
BLL_OSL 5 018 5 001 3 923 4 281 4 373 4 332 4 234 4 219 4 131 2 758 265.3 
BLL_SVG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000  10 000 63 1.9 
BNN_BOO   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 240 59.4 
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BNN_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 315 13.2 
BNN_SSJ 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 419 17.5 
BNN_TRD 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 2 113 99.9 
BOD_OSL 10 000       10 000 10 000 118 22.0 
BOJ_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 144 26.8 
BOO_EVE 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 418 59.3 
BOO_LKN 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 4 081 159.2 
BOO_LPA      10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 56 10.5 
BOO_MJF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 220 47.6 
BOO_MQN 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 2 065 80.5 
BOO_OSL 5 117 5 056 5 126 5 168 5 142 5 273 5 227 5 219 5 127 7 041 1180.8 
BOO_RET 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 613 23.9 
BOO_SKN 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 8 261 10 000 3 239 126.3 
BOO_SSJ 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 251 51.0 
BOO_SVJ 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 3 416 133.2 
BOO_TOS 5 806 5 666 5 011 7 302 9 283 9 530 9 586 8 426 9 765 2 853 368.3 
BOO_TRD 6 393 5 992 5 332 7 729 9 729 9 723 9 709 9 603 10 000 2 882 378.6 
BOO_VRY 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 359 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 252 18.8 
BRU_OSL 5 026 5 037 5 003 5 003 5 013 5 018 5 000 5 062 5 018 2 580 376.8 
BUD_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 315 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 006 187.7 
BUD_SVG         10 000 168 30.5 
BVG_HFT 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 555 21.6 
BVG_MEH 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 253 9.9 
BVG_VDS    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 254 9.9 
CDG_OSL 5 045 5 027 5 023 5 033 5 087 5 085 5 110 5 001 3 471 4 031 675.9 
CHQ_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 484 6 024 10 000 10 000 10 000 238 44.3 
CPH_HAU  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 98 7.6 
CPH_KRS 10 000 7 408 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 620 126.4 
CPH_OSL 5 449 5 546 5 630 5 379 5 436 5 396 5 593 5 390 5 250 12 456 2248.8 
CPH_SVG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 3 328 416.4 
CPH_TOS         10 000 124 21.4 
CPH_TRD 10 000 5 998 5 439 5 706 5 365 5 104 5 089 7 754 10 000 1 617 147.4 
CPH_TRF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 584 123.6 
DBV_OSL 10 000 10 000 6 841 7 055 7 022 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 096 346 63.2 
DBV_TRD 10 000   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 64 11.9 
DOH_OSL  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 918 238.5 
DUB_OSL 5 000 5 001 5 067 5 014 5 089 5 101 5 057 5 009 5 061 1 040 182.1 
DUS_OSL 3 877 3 436 4 186 5 098 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 996 144.1 
DXB_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 712 8 566 10 000 10 000 8 903 813 301.8 
EBJ_SVG    10 000  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 701 22.0 
EDI_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 490 7 631 7 435 7 483 7 852 768 141.3 
EVE_LPA      10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 56 10.5 
EVE_OSL 5 341 5 225 5 201 5 200 5 366 5 273 5 237 5 253 5 343 4 554 796.5 
EVE_TOS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 266 53.2 
EVE_TRD 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 411 8 278 8 262 8 001 10 000 10 000 742 59.4 
EWR_OSL 10 000 5 003 4 502 5 094 5 113 5 750 7 053 10 000 10 000 724 192.5 
FAO_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 482 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 348 64.8 
FCO_OSL 6 117 6 026 5 370 5 223 5 236 5 840 5 837 5 673 6 833 1 190 217.4 
FDE_FRO   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 256 10.0 
FDE_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 2 940 114.7 
FLL_OSL     10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 228 69.9 
FNC_OSL    10 000    10 000 5 645 146 25.8 
FRA_OSL 5 128 5 137 5 182 5 667 5 854 5 970 7 228 7 389 7 461 4 296 736.4 
FRA_TOS         10 000 70 9.7 
FRO_HOV   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 292 11.4 
FRO_OSL 10 000 10 000 5 523 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 865 74.6 
FRO_SOG        10 000 10 000 440 17.2 
GDN_HAU   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 486 87.5 
GDN_KRS    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 208 37.4 
GDN_OSL 5 102 5 004 5 199 5 160 5 266 5 381 5 391 5 476 6 132 1 108 197.1 
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GVA_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 6 906 4 833 6 818 10 000 7 068 5 838 434 77.6 
GZP_OSL   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 190 33.2 
HAA_HFT 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 861 33.6 
HAA_TOS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 863 33.7 
HAM_OSL 5 573 5 797 5 763 4 527 4 933 3 048 3 364 2 842 3 694 1 344 212.5 
HAM_TRF         10 000 124 23.4 
HAU_OSL 5 097 5 029 5 051 5 146 5 143 5 066 5 055 5 042 5 046 4 430 711.2 
HEL_OSL 3 663 3 602 3 389 3 523 3 543 3 729 3 932 3 794 4 143 4 928 722.6 
HEL_TOS     10 000 10 000   10 000 66 7.5 
HFT_HVG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 361 53.1 
HFT_MEH 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 253 9.9 
HFT_SOJ 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 254 9.9 
HFT_TOS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 536 10 000 4 620 180.2 
HFT_VDS    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 506 19.7 
HOV_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 3 179 124.0 
HOV_SDN  10 000       10 000 299 11.7 
HOV_SOG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 605 23.6 
HVG_MEH 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 858 33.5 
ISB_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 50 17.6 
IST_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 460 292.1 
JFK_OSL    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 477 145.6 
KEF_OSL 5 651 5 084 4 594 4 140 4 037 3 945 4 003 4 000 3 961 2 159 382.2 
KKN_OSL 5 193 5 393 5 923 5 986 6 040 5 893 5 203 5 141 5 124 1 859 301.9 
KKN_TOS 10 000 6 844 5 162 5 202 5 111 5 002 6 474 10 000 10 000 1 201 52.8 
KKN_VAW 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 560 21.8 
KKN_VDS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 715 66.9 
KRK_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 858 159.6 
KRK_SVG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 206 38.3 
KRK_TRD    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 310 57.7 
KRK_TRF 10 000      10 000 10 000 10 000 790 147.3 
KRS_OSL 5 145 5 221 5 302 5 274 5 335 5 260 5 261 5 249 5 165 5 319 881.2 
KRS_STN         10 000 158 12.3 
KRS_SVG 5 143 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 426 25.8 
KRS_TRD   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 284 1 236 104.8 
KSU_MOL  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 287 14.4 
KSU_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 2 359 298.5 
KSU_SVG 5 238 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 895 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 266 13.3 
KSU_TRD  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 403 16.7 
KTW_SVG   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 240 52.9 
KTW_TRF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 684 134.9 
KUN_SVG        10 000 10 000 296 53.3 
LAX_OSL      10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 232 72.3 
LCA_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 154 28.7 
LED_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 94 4.7 
LGW_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 2 980 554.6 
LGW_SVG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 886 164.8 
LGW_TOS 10 000   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 144 26.8 
LGW_TRD 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 496 92.3 
LHR_OSL 5 080 5 073 5 033 5 004 5 010 5 000 5 007 5 031 5 088 5 787 940.7 
LHR_SVG 10 000 6 266 5 030 5 000 5 000 5 032 5 009 5 420 10 000 1 080 165.9 
LIS_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 801 7 499 7 608 7 246 7 220 7 152 872 164.4 
LKL_TOS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 807 77.7 
LKN_OSL        10 000 10 000 275 10.7 
LKN_RET 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 374 14.6 
LKN_SKN        10 000 10 000 241 9.4 
LKN_TOS        10 000 10 000 608 23.7 
LPA_OSL 5 187 5 410 5 485 5 632 5 865 5 594 5 440 5 518 5 838 1 159 213.6 
LPA_TOS      10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 56 10.4 
LPA_TRD  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 104 19.3 
LPA_TRF   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 422 10 000 151 28.1 
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2010 
 
 
2011 
 
 
2012 
Year 
 
 
 
2016 
 
 
2017 
 
 
2018 
Flights  
 
2018 
1000’
Seats 
2018 2013 2014 2015 
LUZ_TRF    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 228 46.6 
LYR_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 394 5 046 5 011 5 002 5 012 5 045 775 138.8 
LYR_TOS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 447 80.3 
MAD_OSL     10 000 10 000 7 978 8 533 7 804 668 123.4 
MAN_OSL 10 000 7 915 5 038 5 064 5 158 5 351 5 371 5 717 6 124 1 104 186.7 
MAN_SVG    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 196 36.5 
MAN_TRF       10 000 10 000 10 000 432 81.6 
MCO_OSL     10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 124 38.3 
MEH_VDS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 551 21.5 
MIA_OSL       10 000 10 000 10 000 138 36.6 
MJF_OSL        10 000 10 000 170 6.6 
MJF_TRD 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 847 72.0 
MJV_OSL 10 000 10 000  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 124 23.1 
MLA_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 86 16.0 
MOL_OSL 5 038 5 070 5 040 5 042 5 051 5 028 4 949 5 063 5 093 3 578 576.9 
MQN_OSL       10 000 10 000 10 000 408 15.9 
MQN_TRD 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 2 241 87.4 
MUC_OSL 7 018 5 321 5 214 5 186 4 868 4 989 5 266 5 425 5 022 3 066 524.7 
MXP_OSL 5 008 5 491 5 180 5 004 5 070 5 081 5 325 5 520 5 513 842 146.0 
NCE_OSL 5 335 5 336 5 095 5 188 5 475 5 638 6 129 6 763 6 572 1 446 261.2 
NCE_TRD 10 000 10 000  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 62 11.5 
NCL_SVG 5 002 5 291 5 689 5 978 5 248 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 526 20.4 
OAK_OSL     10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 124 37.9 
OLA_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 040 47.8 
OLB_OSL 10 000 10 000     10 000 10 000 10 000 132 24.6 
ORY_OSL 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 100 18.6 
OSL_OSY         10 000 409 16.0 
OSL_OTP        10 000 10 000 238 35.3 
OSL_PLQ 10 000 10 000 6 426 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 306 56.9 
OSL_PMI 10 000 10 000 5 744 5 931 6 283 10 000 7 460 6 292 6 920 920 166.7 
OSL_PRG 5 153 5 009 7 373 5 967 7 805 8 294 10 000 10 000 7 991 1 080 198.6 
OSL_PRN      10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 216 40.2 
OSL_PSA 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 6 604 290 52.7 
OSL_PUY 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 6 207 194 33.9 
OSL_RAK 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 154 28.7 
OSL_RIX 6 465 6 151 5 995 6 141 5 731 5 308 5 154 5 239 5 027 2 557 293.3 
OSL_RRS 10 000 10 000 6 943 5 402 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 212 48.3 
OSL_SAW      10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 543 100.7 
OSL_SDN 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 936 36.5 
OSL_SJJ    10 000  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 70 13.0 
OSL_SKN        10 000 10 000 122 4.8 
OSL_SOG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 964 76.6 
OSL_SPU 10 000 6 999 5 543 5 306 5 029 5 129 5 259 5 000 5 009 612 110.8 
OSL_SRP 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 350 63.9 
OSL_SSJ  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 265 10.7 
OSL_STN       10 000 10 000 10 000 2 004 378.8 
OSL_SVG 5 014 5 051 5 060 5 044 5 016 5 025 5 015 5 003 5 000 14 642 2474.6 
OSL_SVJ        10 000 10 000 266 10.4 
OSL_SVO 10 000 5 528 6 427 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 455 208.1 
OSL_SXF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 2 096 389.9 
OSL_SZG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 64 11.9 
OSL_SZZ 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 206 38.3 
OSL_TFS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 274 51.0 
OSL_TLL 5 194 5 218 5 464 5 053 5 016 4 373 3 114 4 347 5 270 1 616 200.4 
OSL_TOS 5 217 5 210 5 402 5 445 5 288 5 235 5 261 5 240 5 089 9 770 1694.2 
OSL_TRD 5 000 5 022 5 017 5 007 5 002 5 006 5 001 4 985 4 975 17 149 2918.4 
OSL_TXL 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 545 6 260 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 221 746 120.5 
OSL_VCE  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 222 41.3 
OSL_VIE 6 074 6 150 7 390 6 986 6 432 5 990 5 686 5 812 5 426 1 454 199.8 
OSL_VNO 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 565 3 758 5 696 5 777 1 058 199.0 
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2011 
 
 
2012 
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2016 
 
 
2017 
 
 
2018 
Flights  
 
2018 
1000’
Seats 
2018 2013 2014 2015 
OSL_VRN        10 000 10 000 112 20.8 
OSL_WAW 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 4 639 1 898 279.5 
OSL_ZAG        10 000 10 000 154 15.4 
OSL_ZRH 6 028 6 030 5 949 5 866 5 555 5 218 5 076 5 001 5 000 1 626 229.9 
OSY_RVK 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 065 41.5 
OSY_TRD 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 260 49.1 
OTP_TRF    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 242 49.0 
OUL_TOS        10 000 10 000 104 4.9 
PMI_TRF   5 000 5 005 5 694   10 000 10 000 124 23.1 
POZ_TRF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 072 486 88.7 
RET_SVJ         10 000 237 9.2 
RIX_SVG  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 663 10 000 10 000 10 000 156 11.9 
RIX_TRD 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 312 58.0 
RIX_TRF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 438 78.8 
RVK_TRD 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 271 49.6 
SDN_SOG 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 115 43.5 
SKN_SVJ  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 247 9.6 
SKN_TOS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 7 316 10 000 1 477 57.6 
SKP_TRF      10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 210 37.8 
SOJ_TOS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 223 47.7 
SPU_TRD        10 000 10 000 74 13.8 
SSJ_TRD 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 553 63.9 
STN_TRF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 372 70.3 
SVG_SXF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 254 47.2 
SVG_SZZ    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 208 37.4 
SVG_TRD 5 335 6 410 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 793 189.7 
SVG_TRF 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 2 082 161.2 
SZZ_TRF    10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 238 45.3 
TLL_TRD  10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 240 19.5 
TOS_TRD  10 000 10 000 5 842 4 757 5 482 5 534 6 100 5 701 330 32.5 
TOS_VDS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 270 49.5 
TRD_TRF 10 000 10 000 5 019 5 024 5 000 8 571 10 000 10 000 10 000 1 996 174.8 
TRF_VNO   10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 466 107.2 
TRF_WAW 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 602 137.8 
TRF_WMI   10 000 10 000   10 000 10 000 10 000 648 120.8 
TRF_WRO 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 5 006 526 96.8 
VAW_VDS 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 10 000 862 33.6 
Note: table contains only city-pairs that were served in 2018; city-pair-dyads in alphabetic structure - e.g.  ‘Oslo-Molde’ 
shown as ‘MOL_OSL’;  
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Attachment 4 
 
Table 11: City-pairs with ‘moderately concentrated markets’ in 2018 
City-pair 
 
HHI-score ‘Available seats’  ‘Route-type’ 
MUC-PMI 1895 884 970 Europe 
FRA-PMI 2194 1 064 482 Europe 
CGN-LPA 2247 155 950 Europe 
DUS-LPA 2298 394 543 Europe 
JFK-MXP 2342 1 015 633 Intercont. 
DUS-PMI 2386 1 642 925 Europe 
DUS-TFS 2442 335 841 Europe 
LAX-LHR 2444 2 016 500 Intercont. 
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